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THE NECESSARY NARROWING OF 
GENERAL PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
WM. GRAYSON LAMBERT?
ABSTRACT
General personal jurisdiction allows a court to issue a binding judgment 
against a defendant in any case, even if the facts giving rise to the case are 
unrelated to that forum.  In the six decades after International Shoe v. Wash-
ington, courts held that general jurisdiction existed whenever a defendant had 
substantial continuous and systemic contacts with the forum.  This rule was 
narrowed significantly in 2011, however, when the Supreme Court in Goodyear
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown held that general jurisdiction was 
properly exercised only when a defendant had sufficient contacts to be “at 
home” in the forum.
This “at home” rule has been criticized by many scholars for a variety of 
reasons, most of which focus on the results that they contend the rule produces. 
This Article offers a strong defense of the “at home” rule as a positive doctrinal 
development in personal jurisdiction jurisprudence because the rule is both 
clear and internally consistent.  As a clear rule, it provides simplicity and pre-
dictability on this jurisdictional question that should reduce litigation on a non-
merits issue.
As an internally consistent rule, it creates more logically coherent results. 
Courts and scholars have never agreed on a single theory of why personal ju-
risdiction is limited to certain forums in the first place; indeed, the Supreme 
Court has offered many competing (and at times incompatible) theories, includ-
ing the territorial reach of the forum, fairness, whether the defendant consented 
to suit in the forum, the foreseeability of being sued in the forum, the conven-
ience to the defendant of litigating in the forum, the forum’s interest in exercis-
ing jurisdiction, and the defendant’s liberty interest.  The “at home” rule fits 
logically with each of these justifications—and far better than the old rule. 
Thus, no matter which justification for personal jurisdiction one prefers, this 
new rule provides a more solid foundation for the doctrine of general jurisdic-
tion and is a welcome change in personal jurisdiction.
? © William Grayson Lambert.  Duke University School of Law, J.D. 2012; University of Virginia, 
B.A. 2009. Associate, McGuireWoods LLP. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
When the wheel on a bus bound for Charles de Gaulle Airport in France 
failed and the resulting crash killed two thirteen-year-old North Carolina boys, 
no one could have predicted that another wheel would be set in motion—one 
that would redefine general personal jurisdiction.  That accident led to a lawsuit 
against Goodyear USA and three foreign subsidiaries in North Carolina state 
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court, based on allegations that the Goodyear tire on the bus was defective.1
Rejecting the North Carolina Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the foreign 
Goodyear defendants were subject to general personal jurisdiction in North 
Carolina because they had purposefully availed themselves of that state by put-
ting their tires into the stream of commerce,2 the United States Supreme Court 
held that these defendants were not subject to general personal jurisdiction be-
cause they lacked contacts “so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them 
essentially at home” in the Tar Heel state.3
Scholars quickly recognized that the Court’s 2011 decision in Goodyear
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown4 marked a significant change for gen-
eral jurisdiction,5 as the Court’s Daimler AG v. Bauman6 decision further did 
three years later.7  In reacting to these decisions, some scholarship has been 
largely descriptive,8 and some has been theory-propounding.9  Some has con-
sidered the implications of the decisions for general jurisdiction and the open 
questions that remain.10  And some has analyzed how these new changes to 
general jurisdiction affect specific personal jurisdiction.11  On the whole, much 
1. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 918 (2011).
2. See Brown v. Meter, 681 S.E.2d 382, 395 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) rev’d sub nom. Goodyear
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A., 564 U.S. at 926. 
3. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A., 564 U.S. at 919 (emphasis added) (quoting Int’l
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945)). 
4. Id. at 915.
5. See, e.g., Michael H. Hoffheimer, General Personal Jurisdiction After Goodyear Dunlop Tires 
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 549, 549–50 (2012); Allan R. Stein, The Meaning of 
“Essentially at Home” in Goodyear Dunlop, 63 S.C. L. REV. 527 (2012). 
6. 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
7. See, e.g., Judy M. Cornett & Michael H. Hoffheimer, Good-Bye Significant Contacts: General 
Personal Jurisdiction After Daimler AG v. Bauman, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 101, 103 (2015); Bernadette 
Bollas Genetin, The Supreme Court’s New Approach to Personal Jurisdiction, 68 SMU L. REV. 107 
(2015).
8. See generally Personal Jurisdiction—General Jurisdiction—Daimler AG v. Bauman, 128
HARV. L. REV. 311 (2014) (summarizing and analyzing Daimler AG).
9. See generally Carol Andrews, Another Look at General Personal Jurisdiction, 47 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 999 (2012) (considering what Goodyear means for the doctrine of personal jurisdic-
tion).
10. See, e.g., Hoffheimer, supra note 5, at 592–609 (considering Goodyear’s implications for
practice).
11. See generally Alan M. Trammell, A Tale of Two Jurisdictions, 68 VAND. L. REV. 501 (2015) 
(exploring the implications for specific personal jurisdiction in light of the Court’s decisions on general 
jurisdiction).Even a cursory review of this scholarship reveals the tensions in personal jurisdiction ju-
risprudence.  Professor Stephen E. Sachs has written that “[t]he field is widely described as a mess, an 
irrational and unpredictable due process morass.” Stephen E. Sachs, How Congress Should Fix Per-
sonal Jurisdiction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1301, 1302 (2014).  Given this confusion, Professor Sachs 
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of this scholarship has been critical.12
Contrary to the weight of this body of scholarship on the “at home” rule of 
Goodyear and Daimler AG, I argue that this new rule is a welcome change to 
general personal jurisdiction for two reasons.  First, the “at home” rule is clear. 
It provides an easy-to-apply rule that will minimize resources expended litigat-
ing an issue other than the merits of a case.  Second, the “at home” rule is more 
logically coherent because it promotes internal consistency in personal jurisdic-
tion decisions.  No matter which justification of personal jurisdiction one adopts 
from among the myriad justifications that the Supreme Court has offered, the 
“at home” rule fits neatly within that framework. 
That the “at home” rule is a positive development for personal jurisdiction 
does not mean that it resolves every case perfectly or is flawless.  Indeed, the 
rule is not perfect, and personal jurisdiction generally still has many warts.  But 
until a massive overhaul of the doctrine comes, we should be pleased that gen-
eral jurisdiction will, in the meantime, make more sense than it did previously.  
This Article proceeds in four additional Parts.  It begins in Part II with an 
analysis of general jurisdiction before Goodyear.  It first traces the Pennoyer v. 
Neff13 era, in which a defendant’s presence in a forum was typically required 
for a court to exercise personal jurisdiction.  It then turns to International Shoe 
v. Washington,14 which in many ways revolutionized personal jurisdiction by
focusing on the scope of a defendant’s contacts with a forum through the lens 
of due process to determine whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction was 
constitutional.  Finally, Part II assesses the Supreme Court’s two general-juris-
diction cases between International Shoe and Goodyear, as well as the scope 
of general jurisdiction in the lower courts during these decades. 
Part III focuses on the narrowing of general jurisdiction that took place in 
Goodyear and in Daimler AG.  This Part assesses each of these decisions, be-
fore turning to case law in the lower courts since these two decisions. 
Next, Part IV delves into various justifications of personal jurisdiction, fo-
cusing on justifications offered by Supreme Court Justices.  This Part analyzes 
argues that Congress should adopt “a system of nationwide federal personal jurisdiction, relieving fed-
eral courts of their dependence on state borders.” Id. at 1303.  His article raises provocative arguments 
that challenge American jurisprudence to reshape its approach to personal jurisdiction. Ultimately, 
Congress may adopt such a nationwide system of personal jurisdiction.  But for now, Congress has not 
indicated that this significant reformation is coming.  Thus, courts and scholars must continue to wres-
tle with the current framework, to which this Article seeks to add clarity regarding general jurisdiction. 
12. See generally Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 7, at 106–07 (criticizing the “at home” rule
for a variety of reasons); Kaitlin Hanigan, Comment, A Blunder of Supreme Propositions: General 
Jurisdiction After Daimler AG v. Bauman, 48 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 291 (2014) (arguing that general 
jurisdiction jurisprudence is ambiguous and inconsistent).
13. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
14. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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the theories of territoriality, fairness, consent, foreseeability, convenience of the 
defendant, the forum’s interest, and the defendant’s liberty interest for imposing 
limits on personal jurisdiction.  All of these theories are competing justifica-
tions for how due process protects a defendant from being sued in particular 
jurisdictions.
Finally, Part V explains why the narrowing of general jurisdiction in Good-
year and Daimler AG was a positive jurisprudential development for when a 
defendant is subject to this type of personal jurisdiction.  First, this Part shows 
why it is a clear rule, as applying it is simple and straightforward.  Second, this 
Part demonstrates why it is an internally consistent rule: regardless of which 
justification one adopts, the “at home” rule more logically fits with that theory 
than the old rule of continuous and systematic contacts.  This Part concludes by 
discussing how prominent criticisms of the “at home” rule miss their mark and 
provide no reason to reject this new rule. 
II. GENERAL PERSONAL JURISDICTION BEFORE GOODYEAR
Personal jurisdiction is essential in any lawsuit, for it is “the power of a 
court over a defendant.”15  If a court enters a judgment against a defendant over 
whom the court lacks personal jurisdiction, the judgment is void and has no 
effect.16  Modern personal jurisdiction exists in two forms: general and specific.  
General jurisdiction allows a defendant to be sued about any dispute in a forum, 
while specific jurisdiction permits a defendant to be sued only about disputes 
connected to that forum.17
The term “general jurisdiction” is a relatively new addition to American 
legal lexicon.  It was introduced by Professors Arthur T. von Mehren and Don-
ald T. Trautman in their influential 1966 Harvard Law Review article, which 
coined the terms “general jurisdiction” and “specific jurisdiction” in light of the 
Supreme Court’s description of types of personal jurisdiction in International
15. Foster-Miller, Inc. v. Babcock & Wilcox Can., 46 F.3d 138, 143 (1st Cir. 1995). 
16. See, e.g., Armco, Inc. v. Penrod-Stauffer Bldg. Sys., Inc., 733 F.2d 1087 (4th Cir. 1984) (“We 
conclude that the judgment was void for lack of personal jurisdiction of the defendant, and reverse.”). 
17. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924 (2011) (describing 
the difference in general and specific jurisdiction).Another division of personal jurisdiction is in per-
sonam and in rem jurisdiction: that is, jurisdiction over a person or over property. See In Personam 
Jurisdiction, In Rem Jurisdiction BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining in personam
jurisdiction and in rem jurisdiction).  Because in personam jurisdiction is far more common today, this 
Article limits its focus to personal jurisdiction as it applies to people and entities. 
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Shoe two decades earlier.18  Professors von Mehren and Trautman defined gen-
eral jurisdiction as the “power to adjudicate any kind of controversy when ju-
risdiction is based on relationships, direct or indirect, between the forum and 
the person or persons whose legal rights are to be affected,”19 which remains a 
perfectly suitable definition today. 
The idea of general personal jurisdiction, however, has been present in 
American jurisprudence for far longer, as a defendant could typically always be 
sued in his home state.  Indeed, this idea has been present since the nation’s 
earliest days.20  This Part traces general jurisdiction prior to the Court’s decision 
in Goodyear, briefly discussing the pre-International Shoe era before focusing 
on the development of the doctrine since that seminal decision. 
A. The Pennoyer Era 
When the subject of personal jurisdiction prior to International Shoe is 
raised, most legal scholars and law students immediately think of Pennoyer v. 
Neff, a staple of civil procedure casebooks.21  This case has become the para-
digm example of an era in which personal jurisdiction was “justified . . . in 
terms of the sovereign’s relationship with the defendant or his property, rather 
than in terms of the character of the suit itself.”22
Pennoyer arose when Neff sued Pennoyer to recover possession of a tract 
of land in Oregon.23  Neff claimed title under a grant from the United States, 
18. Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Anal-
ysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136 (1966); see also Genetin, supra note 7, at 113 (referring to the 
article by Professors von Mehren and Trautman as a “germinal work”).
19. von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 18, at 1136; see also Lea Brilmayer, Jennifer Haver-
kamp, & Buck Logan, A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV. 721, 727 (1988) 
(“General jurisdiction rests upon a direct relationship between the defendant and the forum and does 
not differentiate between the various causes of action that the plaintiff may assert against the defendant.  
Once shown, general jurisdiction establishes forum adjudicative power over any controversy involving 
that defendant.”).
20. See, e.g., The Betsey, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 6, 11 (1794) (“The rule authorising the exercise of 
jurisdiction over persons coming within the limits of a country, has been narrowed down, by the vol-
untary law of nations, to cases where there is either a local allegiance, or voluntary submission.” (em-
phasis added)). 
21. See, e.g., STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 61–74 (7th ed. 2008). 
22. Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610, 614 (1988); see
Trammell, supra note 11, at 505 (“Until relatively recently, personal jurisdiction was grounded in ter-
ritorial theories of judicial power.  The centuries-old idea found expression in the canonical case of 
Pennoyer v. Neff . . . .”); Twitchell, supra at 619 (calling Pennoyer “the Supreme Court’s most ambi-
tious attempt to outline the contours of a power-based theory of jurisdiction for the American federal 
system”). 
23. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 719 (1877). 
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while Pennoyer claimed title based on a sheriff’s deed.24  In that state court 
action that ultimately led to the sheriff’s deed, Neff, who was not a resident of 
Oregon, was not served with the summons in Oregon and never appeared in the 
action.25  Neff claimed that the judgment against him was invalid because the 
state court did not have jurisdiction over him, which meant that Pennoyer’s 
sheriff’s deed was also invalid.26
The Supreme Court agreed with Neff.27  The Court based its decision on 
two principles.28  The first was that a state exercised “exclusive jurisdiction” 
over the people and property within its borders.29  And the second was that a 
state had no jurisdiction over people or property outside of its borders.30  The 
Court tied its authority to enforce these principles to the Due Process Clause of 
the then-recently adopted Fourteenth Amendment,31 writing: 
Since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Fed-
eral Constitution, the validity of such judgments may be di-
rectly questioned, and their enforcement in the State resisted, 
on the ground that proceedings in a court of justice to deter-
mine the personal rights and obligations of parties over whom 
that court has no jurisdiction do not constitute due process of 
law.32
In this case, Neff was never properly brought under the state court’s juris-
diction, so the judgment against him that led to the sheriff’s deed was not valid, 
24. Id.
25. Id. at 719–20.
26. Id. at 719, 721–22.
27. Id. at 734.
28. Id. at 722; see also Hoffheimer, supra note 5, at 553 (“The [Pennoyer] opinion committed
the Court to imposing due process restrictions on state court jurisdiction and introduced a territorial 
theory of jurisdiction grounded on the[se] twin propositions . . . .”).
29. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722; see also id. at 720 (“The authority of every tribunal is necessarily
restricted by the territorial limits of the State in which it is established.”). 
30. Id. at 722 (“The several States are of equal dignity and authority, and the independence of
one implies the exclusion of power from all others.”). 
31. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside.  
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of 
the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
32. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733.Although the Court cited the Due Process Clause in its decision,
the case is based primarily on the Full Faith and Credit Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, and interna-
tional law.  See Allan R. Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism in the Law of Personal 
Jurisdiction, 65 TEX. L. REV. 689, 709 (1987) (discussing the role of these ideas in Pennoyer).
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which meant that Pennoyer’s title to the property was void.33
The Court’s decision has been widely recognized as adopting a “territorial 
approach” to personal jurisdiction.34  It approved of jurisdiction over people 
residing in a state, people who consented to jurisdiction, people who were per-
sonally served in the state, and corporations created by the state.35  This ap-
proach to personal jurisdiction has its origins in the law of nations, as nations 
had come to recognize that they could not exercise authority over people in 
another country.36
The personal jurisdiction rules of this era reflected an older world with less 
mobility and cross-border commerce.  In this era, defendants typically lived in 
the jurisdiction where the lawsuit was filed.37  Without the development of rail-
roads, much less automobiles and airplanes, distant travel was rare, with most 
people never going far from home.38  Because travel was rare, most disputes 
33. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 734.The Court spent much its opinion discussing the distinction be-
tween in personam jurisdiction and in rem jurisdiction. See id. at 723–32; see also sources cited supra
note 17.  This discussion raises the interesting question of whether, consistent with the then-prevailing 
view of personal jurisdiction, Mitchell could have prevailed in having his state court judgment treated 
as valid and Pennoyer been declared to have title to the property had Mitchell had the state court attach 
Neff’s property before judgment was entered. 
34. Stanley E. Cox, The Missing “Why” of General Jurisdiction, 76 U. PITT. L. REV. 153, 177
(2014).For an argument that the Pennoyer decision was actually unfaithful to the territorial approach 
it claimed to espouse, see Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Three Deaths of “State Sovereignty” and the Curse 
of Abstraction in the Jurisprudence of Personal Jurisdiction, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 704–08 
(1983).
35. See Hoffheimer, supra note 5, at 553–54 (citing Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733–35).The court
recognized several other categories of people subject to jurisdiction that, while not explicitly within a 
forum’s borders, have a constructive presence there, including nonresidents sued by residents to deter-
mine the legal status of the resident and nonresident (such as whether they were married), and nonres-
idents who made contracts enforceable in the state. See id.
36. See Ellen E. Sward, Justification and Doctrinal Evolution, 37 CONN. L. REV. 389, 437 (2004) 
(“The concept of limits on the exercise of personal jurisdiction originated in relationships between 
nations.” (citing 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 1064 (3d ed. 2002))). 
37. See Twitchell, supra note 22, at 615 (observing that a defendant typically “could be found
where the dispute arose”).Professor Twitchell notes that this limited mobility meant that “courts rarely 
had to confront the fact that their jurisdiction theory gave them great power to decide claims that arose 
elsewhere, but little power to decide claims arising locally, if the defendant could not be found within 
the forum.”  Id.
38. See, e.g., JOSEPH J. ELLIS, THE QUARTET xii (2015) (noting that most Americans during the
Revolution era were born, lived, and died within a thirty-mile radius and that a letter took three weeks 
to get from Boston to Philadelphia); Veronica Hernandez, Note, J. Mcintyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicas-
tro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011): Personal Jurisdiction and the Stream of Commerce Doctrine, 44 U. TOL.
L. REV. 431, 433 (2013) (“Before public investment in transcontinental-transportation infrastructure, 
such as railroad and highways, commerce was generally conducted locally, and disputes tended to be 
local as well.”). 
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were local, with the parties often living in the same town, or at least county. 
But the late nineteenth and early twentieth century saw major changes in 
American society.39  The growth of more efficient and faster modes of travel 
and the development of large corporations that engaged in business throughout 
the country raised new challenges for when a state could exercise jurisdiction 
over a defendant40 and led to increased debate over the limits of personal juris-
diction.41
B. The New Framework of International Shoe
This new world had readily taken hold by the time the Supreme Court took 
up International Shoe in 1945.42  The basic facts are well known,43 but as a brief 
review, International Shoe Co. was a Delaware corporation headquartered in 
Missouri that manufactured and sold (unsurprisingly) shoes.44  The company 
had carefully structured its operations to avoid having any “presence” in the 
State of Washington: it employed between eleven and thirteen salesmen in that 
state, who received samples of shoes and solicited orders from prospective buy-
ers, but who had no authority to enter into contracts on the company’s behalf.45
The State of Washington sued International Shoe, seeking to force the company 
to contribute to the state’s unemployment fund to which all employers in the 
39. See generally CHARLES R. MORRIS, THE TYCOONS (2005) (exploring how business leaders
such as Andrew Carnegie, John D. Rockefeller, and J.P. Morgan helped revolutionize the American 
economy).
40. See, e.g., Twitchell, supra note 22, at 619–23 (discussing how changes in American society
affected personal jurisdiction jurisprudence); see also Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 753 
(2014) (“In time, however, that strict territorial approach yielded to a less rigid understanding, spurred 
by ‘changes in the technology of transportation and communication, and the tremendous growth of 
interstate business activity.’” (quoting Burnham v. Super. Ct., 495 U.S. 604, 617 (1990))).Of course, 
society is always changing, and technology is always developing. Such ongoing evolutions continue 
to raise questions about rules for personal jurisdiction. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 
U.S. 873, 887 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I do not doubt that there have been 
many recent changes in commerce and communication, many of which are not anticipated by our prec-
edents.  But this case does not present any of those issues.  So I think it unwise to announce a rule of 
broad applicability without full consideration of the modern-day consequences.”).
41. See Sward, supra note 36, at 437–41 (discussing this debate).
42. Indeed, by the time International Shoe was decided on December 3, 1945, the world had
changed dramatically since Pennoyer was handed down, as the world had fought—and survived—two 
world wars and the Cold War was just beginning, global communication was virtually instantaneous, 
and people could travel around the world at speeds unimagined just decades before. 
43. See, e.g., YEAZELL, supra note 21, at 61–67 (using Pennoyer as the lead case in discussing
the origins of personal jurisdiction). 
44. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 313 (1945).
45. Id. at 314; see also Hoffheimer, supra note 5, at 556 (noting the company’s effort to structure 
its legal relations so as to avoid having a legal presence in the State of Washington). 
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state were required to contribute.46  The company challenged the state courts’ 
determination that Washington courts had personal jurisdiction over it.47
The Court began its analysis with a historical review of personal jurisdic-
tion, first noting the territorial regime of Pennoyer.48  This rule had changed, 
however, with the advent of “personal service of summons or other forms of 
notice,” so that now, 
due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant 
to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the ter-
ritory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it 
such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend “tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”49
The Court explained that because a corporation can act only through its 
agents, the necessary inquiry is not whether a corporation’s agents are “present” 
in a jurisdiction, but rather, whether the corporation’s agents within a state en-
gage in activities that are “sufficient to satisfy the demands of due process.”50
The Court then set forth four examples of personal jurisdiction.51  Two of 
these examples are easy cases.  First, when a defendant has continuous and 
systematic contacts in a state and the dispute arose there, the state can exercise 
jurisdiction over the defendant.52  Next, when a defendant lacks such contacts 
and the dispute arose elsewhere, a state may not exercise jurisdiction.53  The 
Court explained this conclusion in terms of fairness to the defendant: “To re-
quire the corporation in such circumstances to defend the suit away from its 
home or other jurisdiction where it carries on more substantial activities has 
been thought to lay too great and unreasonable a burden on the corporation to 
comport with due process.”54  In these examples, both specific and general ju-
risdiction would exist (in the first case) or would not exist (in the second case). 
The other two examples are potentially more difficult.  The third example 
involved general jurisdiction, although the Court did not use that terminology.55
The Court recognized that “there have been instances in which the continuous 
46. Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 311–12.
47. Id. at 315.
48. Id. at 316.
49. Id. (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
50. Id. at 316–17.
51. See Hoffheimer, supra note 5, at 558–60 (describing the framework of the Court’s examples). 
52. Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 317.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. The Court would first use the language of general and specific jurisdiction in Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984). See Hoffheimer, supra note 5, at 568. 
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corporate operations within a state were thought so substantial and of such a 
nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings en-
tirely distinct from those activities.”56  Although the Court did not provide any 
bright lines or specific tests, it did clearly approve of general jurisdiction here. 
The fourth and final example was one of specific jurisdiction.  It involved 
cases in which a defendant is not regularly present in a state, but the defendant’s 
acts, “because of their nature and quality and the circumstances,” may warrant 
the exercise of jurisdiction.57  Part of this inquiry includes whether the defend-
ant “enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws of that state.”58  The Court 
was quick to observe that “the boundary line between those activities which 
justify the subjection of a [defendant] to suit, and those which do not, cannot 
be simply mechanical or quantitative.”59
In light of these principles, the Court determined that International Shoe 
was subject to personal jurisdiction in Washington.60  It had engaged in a large 
volume of business, during which it had “received the benefits and protection 
of the laws of the state.”61  Moreover, this suit arose out of the company’s ac-
tivities in the state.62
So what can be said for general jurisdiction in light of International Shoe?
First, Chief Justice Stone’s opinion affirmed that general jurisdiction is con-
sistent with due process.63  This may seem an obvious point, but it is one worth 
making.  Without it, an entire line of jurisprudence would be untenable. 
Second, concepts of fairness appeared in personal jurisdiction jurispru-
dence.  Whereas older decisions like Pennoyer were based on sovereignty and 
power, the thrust of the analysis in International Shoe was whether requiring a 
person or corporation to defend a suit in a particular jurisdiction “lay too great 
56. Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 318 (citing Mo., K & T R Co. v. Reynolds, 255 U.S. 565 (1921);
St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218, 228 (1913); Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 
N.E. 915, 918 (N.Y. 1917)). 
57. Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 318.
58. Id. at 319.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 320.This holding has been recognized as one based on what is now known as specific
jurisdiction. See, e.g., James R. Pielemeier, Goodyear Dunlop: A Welcome Refinement of the Language 
of General Personal Jurisdiction, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 969, 976 (2012) (“The ultimate result 
in International Shoe was that the defendant was subject to jurisdiction, but under today’s terminology 
it was specific, not general jurisdiction.”). 
61. Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 320.
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., Trammell, supra note 11, at 510 (“International Shoe recognized the continuing
salience of true general jurisdiction, in the sense that such jurisdiction is dispute-blind.”). 
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and unreasonable a burden” on that defendant.64
Third, and despite this second point, the idea of sovereignty that pervaded 
the Court’s opinion in Pennoyer did not disappear entirely in International
Shoe.  In fact, the Court explained that the requirements of due process were 
met only when the “contacts of the corporation with the state of the forum as 
make it reasonable, in the context of our federal system of government, to re-
quire the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there.”65
Thus, ideas of federalism and borders continued to lurk in the Court’s thinking. 
Given these competing ideas, scholars have observed that International
Shoe can be interpreted in significantly different ways.66  On the one hand, In-
ternational Shoe is typically credited with fundamentally shifting the focus of 
personal jurisdiction to fairness, with the inquiry being on the relationship be-
tween the defendant, the forum, and the particular cause of action.67  But on the 
other hand, International Shoe retained sovereignty-based considerations, 
maintaining some continuity with the past.68
C. The Supreme Court’s Two General Jurisdiction Cases Between 
International Shoe and Goodyear
In the more than sixty-five years between International Shoe and Goodyear,
the Supreme Court decided many specific jurisdiction cases, but it decided only 
two cases on general jurisdiction.69  And neither of these two cases provided 
64. Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 317.
65. Id. (emphasis added).Justice Black’s dissent made clear that even if the majority held to some 
notions of sovereignty, he disliked using fairness as a test for personal jurisdiction. He argued that 
phrases like “fair play,” “justice,” and “reasonableness” had “strong emotional appeal” yet were too 
“elastic” and stood to limit the power of the states to regulate and tax those individuals whose activities 
affected what happened within its borders. Id. at 325–26 (Black, J., dissenting). 
66. See Genetin, supra note 7, at 119 (observing that the case is “capable of competing construc-
tions”).
67. See, e.g., Edwin A. Naylor, Comment, The Constitutionality of the Seider Practice After
Shaffer v. Heitner, 49 U. COLO. L. REV. 321, 324 (1978) (“In International Shoe, the court shifted the 
inquiry from the central concern of ‘power’ over a defendant to the interrelationship between the de-
fendant, the litigation, and the forum.”); Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Clarifying General Jurisdiction,
34 SETON HALL L. REV. 807, 812–13 (2004) (“In the mid-twentieth century, International Shoe Co. v. 
Washington reformulated the jurisdictional touchstone from a state’s power over those present within 
its territory to an analysis of the fairness or reasonableness of an exercise of jurisdiction premised on 
the defendant’s forum contacts.”). 
68. See Genetin, supra note 7, at 119 (observing “a second, narrower approach” in International
Shoe is one “that privileges state territorial authority in a manner akin to Pennoyer v. Neff”); Rhodes, 
supra note 67, at 813 (“Yet International Shoe’s new conception still incorporated elements of the 
preexisting American jurisdictional theories.”). 
69. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 925 (2011) (observing 
that the Court had decided only two general jurisdiction cases since International Shoe).
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great insight into the doctrine because the outcome in both cases was so obvi-
ous.70
1. The First Decision: Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.
The first case came less than a decade after International Shoe, when the 
reframed jurisprudence of personal jurisdiction was still in its infancy. Perkins
v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.71 involved a silver and gold mining com-
pany, which had relocated its operations from the Philippines to Ohio during 
World War II, that was sued by Idonah Perkins on claims arising under Philip-
pine law involving dividends and stock certificates.72  The Ohio Supreme Court 
had determined that its state’s courts lacked personal jurisdiction over the com-
pany.73
After dispensing with some preliminary issues, the Court reached the criti-
cal question: whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause pro-
hibited Ohio from issuing a judgment against the mining company on claims 
arising out of events that did not take place in Ohio.  The Court framed the issue 
as “one of general fairness to the corporation.”74  The Court explained that 
simply registering to do business in the state was not conclusive that personal 
jurisdiction existed.75  What really mattered were “continuous and systematic 
corporate activities” that “make it fair and reasonable to subject that corpora-
tion” to personal jurisdiction in Ohio.76  The Court recognized that this case 
“takes [the Court] one step further” in that the subject matter of the lawsuit 
involved out-of-state activities.77  But this extra step gave the Court no pause, 
as it pointed to International Shoe to conclude that due process permitted the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction over claims arising from out-of-state conduct 
against a defendant whose in-state activities were sufficiently substantial.78
70. See Trammell, supra note 11, at 510 (“Because both [Perkins and Helicopteros] seemed so
easy on their facts, they offered only limited guidance to lower courts.”).
71. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).Although the Court did not use the language of general jurisdiction, see
sources cited supra note 55, its framing of the issue makes clear that it considered this case one of 
general jurisdiction, see Perkins, 342 U.S. at 438 (“The corporation has been carrying on in Ohio a 
continuous and systematic, but limited, part of its general business.  Its president, while engaged in 
doing such business in Ohio, has been served with summons in this proceeding.  The cause of action 
sued upon did not arise in Ohio and does not relate to the corporation’s activities there.”). 
72. Id. at 438–39.
73. Id. at 439.
74. Id. at 445.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 446.
78. Id. at 446–47.
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Applying this rule to the facts of this case, the Court held that Ohio could 
exercise personal jurisdiction over the mining company and decide Perkins’s 
claims.79  The Court drew on the description of the facts offered by the Ohio 
Court of Appeals: After the Japanese conquered the Philippines early in World 
War II, the president and general manager of the mining company returned to 
his home in Ohio.80  From this new location, he “did many things on behalf of 
the company,” including keeping files, carrying on correspondence, handling 
the company’s payroll, holding directors’ meetings, and supervising activities 
in the Philippines.81  All of this activity amounted to “continuous and systematic 
supervision of the necessarily limited wartime activities of the company.”82
The Court’s decision in Perkins warrants several observations.  First is the 
Court’s reliance on general jurisdiction.  Although another seemingly obvious 
point, the Court in this case expressly approved of general jurisdiction, in a way 
that it had not done in International Shoe.83 International Shoe had implicitly 
recognized the doctrine, but that decision had not relied on general jurisdiction 
for its holding.84  In Perkins, the Court based its decision on general jurisdiction, 
leaving no doubt that this concept remained viable in the International Shoe
world.85
Of equal importance is the Court’s invocation of fairness to the defendant.86
In other words, the Court (at least in this case) viewed fairness as the “why” 
that justified the “what” of general jurisdiction.87  This articulation of the due 
process test for personal jurisdiction embraced International Shoe’s dominant 
theme.88 Perkins did not, however, ever touch upon any sovereignty-based jus-
tification for personal jurisdiction, which was present in International Shoe.89
The Court’s silence on this justification does not necessarily mean the Court 
viewed that justification as illegitimate, as its silence cannot be treated as akin 
to disavowing all sovereignty-based justifications for personal jurisdiction. 
Still, the Court’s singular reliance on fairness represents, at the very least, a 
79. Id. at 447–48.
80. Id. at 447.
81. Id. at 448.
82. Id.
83. See Brilmayer, Haverkamp, & Logan, supra note 19, at 724 (noting that the Court “voiced
its approval of general jurisdiction” in Perkins).
84. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945).
85. Perkins, 342 U.S. at 447–49.
86. See id. at 445 (explaining that the issue was “one of general fairness to the corporation”).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See generally id. at 437.
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shift in the justification for personal jurisdiction. 
Perkins is also noteworthy for its “extreme facts.”90  This case is the only 
time that the Court has upheld the exercise of general jurisdiction.91  The out-
come of this case is, even upon cursory reflection, unsurprising.  Justice Gins-
burg went so far in Goodyear as to call Perkins the “textbook case of general 
jurisdiction.”92  In essence, the headquarters of the mining company had been 
moved from the Philippines to Ohio as a result of the Japanese occupation,93
meaning that Ohio was now a place where the company could be considered 
“at home,” to use the Court’s more recent metaphor for general jurisdiction.94
Finally, the Court’s language of “continuous and systematic” to describe 
the mining company’s activities was largely adopted by lower courts as the 
standard for whether a defendant was subject to general jurisdiction.95  Federal 
courts began employing this language to determine whether they could exercise 
general personal jurisdiction over defendants.96
2. The Second Decision: Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall
The Court’s only other general jurisdiction case in between International
Shoe and Goodyear was Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall.97
If Perkins was an easy case in which general jurisdiction did exist, Helicopteros
was an easy case in which general jurisdiction did not exist. 
90. Hoffheimer, supra note 5, at 566.
91. Id. at 565.
92. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 928 (2011) (quoting Do-
nahue v. Far E. Air Transport Corp., 652 F.2d 1032, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). 
93. See WILLIAMSON MURRAY & ALLAN R. MILLET, A WAR TO BE WON 181–88 (2000) (de-
scribing the Japanese conquest of the Philippines early in World War II). 
94. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761 n.19 (2014).
95. See Brilmayer, Haverkamp, & Logan, supra note 19, at 724 (observing that this language
“became the test used by lower courts to evaluate assertions of general jurisdiction”); Cornett & Hoff-
heimer, supra note 7, at 112 (“Before Daimler, courts accepted the theory that sufficiently significant 
and continuous contacts could support general jurisdiction.”). 
96. See, e.g., Allison v. Lomas, 387 F. Supp. 2d 516, 519–20, 521 (M.D.N.C. 2005) (applying
the “continuous and systematic” language for general jurisdiction in holding that it lacked personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant-lawyer who lived in Maryland and maintained his law office in Wash-
ington, D.C.); CEM Corp. v. Pers. Chemistry AB, 192 F. Supp. 2d 438, 442 (W.D.N.C. 2002) (holding 
that “untargeted advertising and solicitation in national trade journals and at national industry trade 
shows and via a passive website, responding to requests initiated by [the plaintiff], and de minimus 
sales activities, are wholly insufficient to support the exercise of general personal jurisdiction” over an 
out-of-state defendant). 
97. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
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Helicopteros was a Colombian company that provided helicopter transpor-
tation for oil and construction companies in South America.98  In January 1976, 
one of the company’s helicopters crashed, killing four Americans who were on 
board.99  These four people worked for a Peruvian consortium whose alter ego 
was a joint venture based in Houston, known as Consorcio.100  Consorcio had 
contracted with Helicopteros to provide services for its construction of a pipe-
line in Peru, and the negotiations for the contract took place in Houston, to 
which the Helicopteros CEO travelled at the request of Consorcio.101
Helicopteros had a few other contacts with Texas as well.  It purchased 
eighty percent of its helicopters from a Texas-based company between 1970 
and 1977, along with spare parts and accessories, totaling more than $4 mil-
lion.102  Helicopteros sent pilots to Texas to train and retrieve helicopters.103  It 
also received payments from Consorcio’s bank located in Texas.104  Helicopte-
ros, however, had no real or personal property in Texas, did not solicit business 
in the state, and was not registered to do business there.105
Based on these contacts, the representatives of the four Americans killed in 
the 1976 crash sued Helicopteros in Texas state court.106  The Texas Supreme 
Court ultimately concluded that the Due Process Clause permitted the exercise 
of personal jurisdiction over Helicopteros.107
The Supreme Court disagreed.  The Court began its analysis by quoting 
International Shoe’s language of “minimum contacts” and “traditional notions 
of fair play and substantial justice.”108  The Court reaffirmed the validity of 
general jurisdiction: 
Even when the cause of action does not arise out of or relate to 
the foreign corporation’s activities in the forum State, due pro-
cess is not offended by a State’s subjecting the corporation to 
its in personam jurisdiction when there are sufficient contacts 
between the State and the foreign corporation.109
98. Id. at 409. 
99. Id. at 409–10. 
100. Id. at 410. 
101. Id.
102. Id. at 411. 
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 411–12. 
106. Id. at 412. 
107. Id. at 412–13. 
108. Id. at 414 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). 
109. Id. (internal footnote omitted).Note how this articulation of general jurisdiction—”sufficient 
contacts between the State and the foreign corporation”—sweeps far more broadly than the “at home” 
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Recognizing that the plaintiffs had not sought to invoke specific jurisdic-
tion, the Court framed the issue in this case as “whether [Helicopteros’s con-
tacts with Texas] constitute the kind of continuous and systematic general busi-
ness contacts” that existed in Perkins.110  The Court gave little weight to the 
CEO’s single trip to the Lone Star state, and the Court counted as “negligible” 
the fact that Consorcio’s payments were drawn on a Texas-based bank.111  The 
Court was equally unpersuaded by the purchase of helicopters and training of 
pilots in Texas, relying on its 1923 decision in Rosenberg Brothers & Co. v. 
Curtis Brown Co.112 (an opinion cited approvingly in International Shoe)113 to 
reject the idea that regular purchases in a state make a corporation subject to 
general jurisdiction in that state.114
As with Perkins, Helicopteros merits several observations.  First, this case 
seems as straightforward as Perkins, just in the opposite direction.  Although 
Justice Brennan argued in his dissent that specific jurisdiction should exist 
here,115 the majority opinion made clear that the parties agreed that specific ju-
risdiction did not exist and that this case involved only general jurisdiction.116
Focusing therefore on only general jurisdiction, this case cannot be difficult. 
Indeed, if a Texas court were to have general jurisdiction over Helicopteros, 
then general jurisdiction would amount to nothing more than “doing business” 
jurisdiction.  In other words, simply doing any business in a state beyond an 
isolated transaction could give rise to jurisdiction in that state for any unrelated 
claim. 
Second, the Court’s reliance on its 1923 decision in Rosenberg indicates 
that International Shoe did not implicitly overrule all of the Court’s earlier de-
cisions on personal jurisdiction, despite Justice Brennan’s protestations to the 
contrary.117  Much of the Court’s analysis in International Shoe itself should 
rule.
110. Id. at 416. 
111. Id. at 416–17. 
112. 260 U.S. 516 (1923). 
113. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945). 
114. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 417–18.Justice Brennan’s dissent in Helicopteros challenged the 
continuing validity of Rosenberg, based on the fact that it was decided before International Shoe and 
argued that this case was one in which specific jurisdiction should exist because, according to Justice 
Brennan, Helicopteros’s contacts with Texas were related to the accident.  See id. at 420–28 (Brennan, 
J., dissenting).
115. See id. at 427–28. 
116. See id. at 415 (Opinion of the Court). 
117. See id. at 421–23 (Brennan, J., dissenting).In later years, however, the Court would put less 
weight on these pre-International Shoe decisions. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761 
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have made this clear.  There, the Court discussed a plethora of earlier personal 
jurisdiction cases without ever suggesting those cases were no longer good 
law.118  The continuing validity of these cases is significant because it under-
scores that the ideas underlying those decisions still continue to have some im-
pact on the theories of personal jurisdiction. 
3. General Jurisdiction in Light of Perkins and Helicopteros
The fact that Perkins and Helicopteros were easy cases may have been nice
for the Justices deciding those cases, but it was unfortunate for district judges, 
circuit judges, and state court judges. Because the cases were so straightfor-
ward, the Court’s resolution of them did not necessarily provide clear guidance 
for lower courts.119  Without such guidance, courts’ approach to general juris-
diction was inconsistent, and they thus “often reach[ed] discordant results.”120
For example, on some occasions, courts refused to stretch general jurisdic-
tion when a defendant’s activities in a state were limited.121  These decisions 
required a “substantial” connection between the defendant and the forum 
state.122  But on other occasions, courts seemingly lowered the bar, relying on 
merely volume of sales and the presence of a sales representative in the state to 
hold that general jurisdiction existed.123
Ultimately, the state of general personal jurisdiction after International
Shoe (or really, after Perkins) was inconsistent, but it centered on a defendant’s 
continuous and systematic contacts with the forum.124  This standard meant that 
n.18 (2014) (“Perkins’ unadorned citations to these cases, both decided in the era dominated by Pen-
noyer’s territorial thinking, should not attract heavy reliance today.”  (internal citation omitted)). 
118. See Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 317–19. 
119. See Twitchell, supra note 22, at 612 (stating that the Court’s general jurisdiction decisions 
provide little guidance for “how courts are to determine the scope of general jurisdiction in the future”). 
120. Brilmayer, Haverkamp, & Logan, supra note 19, at 724; see also Pielemeier, supra note 60, 
at 980–84 (describing the confusion and inconsistency in how federal courts approached general juris-
diction after Helicopteros).
121. See, e.g., Accu-Sport Int’l, Inc. v. Swing Dynamics, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 2d 923, 927–28 
(M.D.N.C. 2005) (holding that general jurisdiction did not exist based on limited transactions in the 
forum state). 
122. Zuffa, LLC v. Showtime Networks, Inc., No. 2:07-CV-00369RLHPAL00369-RLH-PAL, 
2007 WL 2406812, at *2 (D. Nev. Aug. 17, 2007). 
123. See, e.g., S. Pride, Inc. v. Turbo Tek Enters., Inc., 117 F.R.D. 566, 575–76 (M.D.N.C. 1987) 
(pointing to sales, a sales representative in the state, and local advertisements to hold “without hesita-
tion” that general jurisdiction existed).Still, this decision was not as lax in interpreting general juris-
diction as decisions from other courts. See Trammell, supra note 11, at 512 (“Other courts set the bar 
even lower, holding that defendants could be subject to general jurisdiction based only on a high vol-
ume of sales in the forum (despite a lack of physical presence there).”). 
124. See supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text (describing the use of “continuous and sys-
tematic” as the standard for general jurisdiction after Perkins).
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general jurisdiction required a more stringent showing than specific jurisdic-
tion,125 but general jurisdiction was often treated as meaning “that national cor-
porations with substantial operations in all fifty states (such as McDonalds or 
WalMart) would likely be subject to general personal jurisdiction in all fifty 
states.”126
III. THE SUPREME COURT’S REARTICULATION OF GENERAL JURISDICTION
After general jurisdiction remained mired in this haze for decades, the Su-
preme Court finally offered “needed guidance” for courts and litigants.127  The 
Court’s new focus on general jurisdiction began in 2011 in Goodyear, and it 
continued three years later in Daimler AG.128  This Part explores those two de-
cisions and how lower federal courts have interpreted the Court’s newly an-
nounced rule. 
A. The Narrowing Begins: Goodyear
The facts of Goodyear are heartbreaking.  Two thirteen-year-old boys from 
North Carolina, Julian Brown and Matthew Helms, were in France on a trip 
with other young soccer players.129  The boys “were once considered among the 
best young soccer players in their home state of North Carolina. . . . [and] were 
invited to play on [an] Olympic development team at European tourna-
ments.”130  On the bus ride to Charles de Gaulle Airport outside of Paris to begin 
their trip home, a tire blew, and the bus overturned.131  Both Brown and Helms 
were killed.132
Their parents sued various Goodyear entities, including Goodyear USA and 
125. See, e.g., Worldwide Ins. Network, Inc. v. Trustway Ins. Agencies, LLC, No. 1:04CV00906, 
2006 WL 288422, at *6 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 6, 2006) (observing that general jurisdiction imposes a “more 
stringent” analysis than specific jurisdiction does); 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1067.5 (3d ed. 2002) (recognizing the difference between 
standards of general and specific jurisdiction). 
126. Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Toward a New Equilibrium in 
Personal Jurisdiction, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 207, 214 (2014). 
127. Hoffheimer, supra note 5, at 551. 
128. See Genetin, supra note 7, at 107–08 (“[I]n Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. 
Brown, the Supreme Court began the move toward its new doctrinal approach.”). 
129. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 920 (2011). 
130. Brief for Respondents at 3, Goodyear Luxembourg Tires, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 
(2011) (No. 10-76). 
131. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A., 564 U.S. at 920. 
132. Id.
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Goodyear affiliates in France, Turkey, and Luxembourg.133  The tire was alleg-
edly manufactured by the Turkish subsidiary,134 and the claims against the for-
eign subsidiaries were based on theories of negligent design, construction, test-
ing, and inspection.135  The foreign subsidiaries had no place of business or 
employees in North Carolina, and they did not design, manufacture, or advertise 
their tires in the state.136  They did, however, have a small percentage of their 
tires distributed in North Carolina by other Goodyear affiliates.137
The North Carolina Court of Appeals held that the foreign subsidiaries were 
subject to general jurisdiction in the state.138  That court’s analysis focused on 
a stream-of-commerce theory that had developed in the Supreme Court’s spe-
cific jurisdiction cases.139  The court of appeals concluded that the foreign sub-
sidiaries “have, without question, purposefully and intentionally manufactured 
tires and placed them in the stream of interstate commerce without any limita-
tion on the extent to which those tires could be sold in North Carolina.”140
The Supreme Court rejected this analysis.  The Court, in an opinion by Jus-
tice Ginsburg, began with the Due Process Clause and the “canonical opinion” 
of International Shoe.141  The Court explained the difference between general 
and specific jurisdiction and observed that its decisions since International
Shoe focused primarily on specific, not general, jurisdiction.142
Criticizing the North Carolina Court of Appeals for blurring these concepts, 
the Court explained that “[a] corporation’s ‘continuous activity of some sorts 
within a state . . . is not enough to support the demand that the corporation be 
133. Id. at 920–21.Unlike the foreign subsidiaries, Goodyear USA did not challenge North Car-
olina’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over it. Id. at 921. 
134. Id.
135. Brown v. Meter, 681 S.E.2d 382, 384 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) rev’d sub nom. Goodyear Dun-
lop Tires Operations, S.A., 564 U.S. 915. 
136. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A., 564 U.S. at 921. 
137. Id.  The Court stated that the foreign subsidiaries had “tens of thousands out of tens of 
millions manufactured between 2004 and 2007” distributed in North Carolina. Id.
138. Id. at 921–22. 
139. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297–98 (1980) (“The 
forum State does not exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction 
over a corporation that delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they 
will be purchased by consumers in the forum State.”).How broad this concept stretches is unclear in 
light of the Court’s decision J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 876, 877 (2011).  De-
cided the same day as Goodyear, Nicastro casts doubt on this theory, but Goodyear discussed the 
stream-of-commerce analysis not unfavorably. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A., 564 U.S. at 
927.
140. Brown, 681 S.E.2d at 394. 
141. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A., 564 U.S. at 923. 
142. Id. at 924. 
38800-m
qt_100-2 Sheet No. 55 Side A      02/22/2017   09:25:38
38800-mqt_100-2 Sheet No. 55 Side A      02/22/2017   09:25:38
C M
Y K
LAMBERT-P.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/17 11:37 AM
2016] THE NECESSARY NARROWING OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION 395 
amenable to suits unrelated to that activity.’”143  Instead, the contacts must be 
sufficiently continuous and systematic “as to render [the defendant] essentially 
at home in the forum State.”144  The Court reviewed Perkins and Helicopteros
to illustrate the nature of general jurisdiction and then compared this case to 
those earlier decisions, holding that general jurisdiction did not exist in this 
case.145
In many ways, Goodyear was an even easier case than Perkins or Helicop-
teros.  One scholar has gone so far as claiming that “[i]t is hard to imagine a 
more egregious example of a lower court’s abuse of general jurisdiction possi-
bilities than what occurred in Goodyear.”146  Despite the ease of determining 
the correct outcome, the Court did take the affirmative step of laying out a spe-
cific test for general jurisdiction that addressed the doctrine more concretely 
than earlier cases. 
In that vein, Goodyear’s most impactful holding was its “clos[ing] the door 
on the most expansive applications of general jurisdiction.”147  In the words of 
one commentator, the decision “represented a dramatic shift” in general juris-
diction.148  The Court embraced explicitly the “continuous and systematic” lan-
guage from Perkins, but the Court limited those types of contacts to ones that 
are so strong as to make a defendant “at home” in the forum.149  Thus, the 
broader conceptions of general jurisdiction that had developed over previous 
decades are no longer valid.150  Indeed, virtually immediately after Goodyear,
scholars recognized this change.151
143. Id. at 927 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945)). 
144. Id. at 919 (emphasis added). 
145. Id. at 929 (“Measured against Helicopteros and Perkins, North Carolina is not a forum in 
which it would be permissible to subject petitioners to general jurisdiction.”). 
146. Cox, supra note 34, at 162; see also Stein, supra note 5, at 528, 530 (calling the decision 
“deeply flawed” and noting that “[i]f a first-year law student had written that answer on my Civil 
Procedure final exam, I would have had a hard time giving it a passing grade”); Trammell, supra note 
11, at 513 (stating that “the Supreme Court expeditiously corrected a convoluted—perhaps even spe-
cious—jurisdictional analysis by the North Carolina courts” (internal footnote omitted)). 
147. Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 7, at 114. 
148. Trammell, supra note 11, at 515. 
149. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A., 564 U.S. at 919. 
150. See sources cited supra note 123; see also Pielemeier, supra note 60, at 989 (“One fairly 
clear consequence of the case is that general jurisdiction based on regular sales in the forum is clearly 
dead.”).
151. See, e.g., Meir Feder, Goodyear, “Home,” and the Uncertain Future of Doing Business 
Jurisdiction, 63 S.C. L. REV. 671, 678 (2012); Todd David Peterson, The Timing of Minimum Contacts 
After Goodyear and McIntyre, 80 Geo. WASH. L. REV. 202, 216 (2011); Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, 
Nineteenth Century Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine in A Twenty-First Century World, 64 FLA. L. REV.
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Yet the Court offered little detail on exactly what this narrowed view of 
general jurisdiction meant or why it was necessary.  The use of “at home” was 
a new analogy in personal jurisdiction jurisprudence—“a neologism lacking 
any fixed legal meaning,” as one scholar puts it.152  In addition to the lack of a 
full explanation of the scope of the term “at home,” the Court’s reasoning in 
Goodyear also left unanswered the question of why general jurisdiction should 
be narrowed.153  Despite these open questions and criticisms,154 Goodyear was 
seen by at least one commentator as “a highly positive development” for a doc-
trine that had seen scant attention from the Supreme Court.155
B. The Narrowing Continues: Daimler AG
If Goodyear was the opening volley in restricting general jurisdiction, 
Daimler AG was the full assault.  The Court’s analysis and language solidi-
fied—even if not completely clarified—the new, narrower limits of general ju-
risdiction.
The case arose when the plaintiffs sued Daimler AG, the German manufac-
turer of Mercedes-Benz cars, in federal court in California, alleging that Daim-
ler AG’s Argentinian subsidiary “collaborated with state security forces to kid-
nap, detain, torture, and kill certain MB Argentina workers” during Argentina’s 
Dirty War between 1976 and 1983,156 in violation of the Alien Tort Statute157
387, 430 (2012).At least one scholar, however, has observed that the Goodyear decision can be inter-
preted in vastly different ways.  Potentially, it could be a sweeping revision to general jurisdiction; 
alternatively, it could simply be extending the reasoning of Helicopteros to apply to sporadic sales in 
a jurisdiction.  See Hoffheimer, supra note 5, at 573–90 (analyzing these two potential interpretations 
of Goodyear).
152. Hoffheimer, supra note 5, at 583.Professor Hoffheimer criticized the introduction of “at 
home” as resulting in too many metaphors in personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. See id. at 594–95. 
But notably, the idea of “at home” as a concept of general jurisdiction existed long before Goodyear.
See, e.g., Twitchell, supra note 22, at 633 (observing that “general jurisdiction is almost always avail-
able at a defendant’s ‘home base’”).  Plus, most of the metaphors involve specific jurisdiction, not 
general jurisdiction, so “at home” should not be particularly confusing, as long as courts keep the lines 
of specific and general jurisdiction separate. See infra notes 337–46 and accompanying text. 
153. See Cox, supra note 34, at 165 (“The Goodyear opinion Justice Ginsburg wrote for a unan-
imous Court did not provide any underlying general jurisdiction rationales that would lead ineluctably 
to Justice Ginsburg’s restrictive preferences.  The missing ‘why’ for general jurisdiction continued to 
be missing.”).
154. See Hoffheimer, supra note 5, at 595–602 (discussing the questions that remain open); 
Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 126, at 227 (“[T]he Court’s rulings probably raised more questions 
than they settled, and the opinions certainly raised new grounds for fights over personal jurisdiction.”). 
155. Pielemeier, supra note 60, at 989. 
156. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 751 (2014). 
157. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1948). 
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and the Torture Victim Protection Act.158  The plaintiffs sought to hold Daimler 
AG liable for the acts of its Argentinian subsidiary, and their theory of jurisdic-
tion was that Daimler AG was subject to general jurisdiction in California based 
on either Daimler AG’s own contacts in the state, or alternatively, based on the 
contacts of MBUSA, its American subsidiary.159  The district court dismissed 
the complaint based on a lack of personal jurisdiction.160  The Ninth Circuit 
initially affirmed that decision,161 but it subsequently granted the plaintiffs’ pe-
tition for rehearing162 and reversed the district court’s decision, holding that 
MBUSA’s contacts with California could be imputed to Daimler AG.163
In another opinion by Justice Ginsburg, the Supreme Court held that general 
jurisdiction did not exist over Daimler AG.  The Court again offered a historical 
review of its personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, beginning with Pennoyer,
moving to International Shoe, Perkins, and Helicopteros, and finally focusing 
on Goodyear.164
Against this backdrop, the Court focused on the facts of this case specifi-
cally.165  It rejected the Ninth Circuit’s agency theory of jurisdiction because 
exercising personal jurisdiction over a corporation whenever its subsidiary pro-
vided “important” services to the parent corporation and had sufficient contacts 
with a state for personal jurisdiction would “subject foreign corporations to 
general jurisdiction whenever they have an in-state subsidiary or affiliate, an 
outcome that would sweep beyond even the ‘sprawling view of general juris-
diction’ [the Court] rejected in Goodyear.”166
Instead of a “sprawling” rule of general jurisdiction, the Court explained 
that “only a limited set of affiliations with a forum” give rise to general juris-
diction.167  The Court observed that “[f]or an individual, the paradigm forum 
for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile.”168  For a 
158. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992). 
159. Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 752. 
160. See Bauman v. Daimlerchrysler AG, No. C-04-00194 RMW, 2007 WL 486389 (N.D. Cal. 
Feb. 12, 2007).
161. See Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 579 F.3d 1088, 1098 (9th Cir. 2009). 
162. See Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 603 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 2010). 
163. See Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909, 931 (9th Cir. 2011). 
164. Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 753–58. 
165. The Court made several initial observations.  First, it noted that the plaintiffs never argued 
that specific jurisdiction could apply. Id. at 758.  Second, it stated that Daimler AG never contended 
that MBUSA was not subject to personal jurisdiction in California. Id.
166. Id. at 759–60 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 
929 (2011)). 
167. Id. at 760. 
168. Id. (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A., 564 U.S. at 924). 
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corporation, “the place of incorporation and principal place of business are ‘par-
adigm bases for general jurisdiction.’”169  These examples “have the virtue of 
being unique,” which makes them “easily ascertainable.”170
The Court did note that these examples are not necessarily exclusive.171  Yet 
the Court was quick to disabuse courts and litigants of the idea that this non-
exclusivity meant general jurisdiction was not still particularly narrow, reject-
ing the plaintiffs’ theory that would “approve the exercise of general jurisdic-
tion in every State in which a corporation engages in a substantial, continuous, 
and systematic course of business.”172  The Court stated that the stand-alone 
“continuous and systematic” language from International Shoe was relevant to 
specific jurisdiction, not general jurisdiction.173  Instead, the proper test “is 
whether that corporation’s ‘affiliations with the State are so “continuous and 
systematic” as to render it essentially at home in the forum State.’”174  In con-
ducting this analysis, a court must “apprais[e] . . . a corporation’s activities in 
their entirety, nationwide and worldwide [because a] corporation that operates 
in many places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of them.”175
Under these rules, the Court needed only a paragraph to explain that per-
sonal jurisdiction did not exist in this case.  Essentially, the Court’s holding 
turned on the fact that neither Daimler AG nor MBUSA had its principal place 
of business in California.176




172. Id. at 761 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
173. Id.
174. Id. (internal alteration omitted) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 
564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)). 
175. Id. at 762 n.20; see also Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 7, at 140 (“Daimler requires a 
comparative evaluation of a corporation’s interstate or international activity.”). 
176. Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 762.Justice Sotomayor concurred in the judgment only.  She first 
contended that the majority opinion swept more broadly than the case required. See id. at 764, 766–
67 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment).  She then argued that substance of the majority’s opin-
ion was wrong and that the touchstone of personal jurisdiction since International Shoe had always 
been reasonableness. See id. at 765.  She rejected the idea that a corporation being subject to general 
jurisdiction in a multitude of jurisdictions is unfair or unpredictable. See id. at 770.  To the extent 
having to litigate in a particular forum would be unfair, a defendant could invoke a doctrine like forum 
non conveniens. See id. at 771. Justice Sotomayor argued that the majority’s decision resulted in four 
“deep injustice[s]”: (1) “unduly curtail[ing] the States’ sovereign authority to adjudicate disputes 
against corporate defendants who have engaged in continuous and substantial business operations 
within their boundaries,” id. at 772; (2) “treat[ing] small businesses unfairly in comparison to national 
and multinational conglomerates,” id.; (3) “creat[ing] the incongruous result that an individual defend-
ant whose only contact with a forum State is a one-time visit will be subject to general jurisdiction if 
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This most recent general jurisdiction case leads to several conclusions. 
First, like the prior general jurisdiction cases, Daimler AG is also an easy case.
Consider the way the Court introduced the case: “This case concerns the au-
thority of a court in the United States to entertain a claim brought by foreign 
plaintiffs against a foreign defendant based on events occurring entirely outside 
the United States.”177  Framed this way, the case’s outcome can hardly be de-
bated.178  But unlike Perkins and Helicopteros and like Goodyear, the Court 
used this case as an opportunity to delve more deeply into the doctrine of gen-
eral jurisdiction. 
Second, the decision elucidated—and perhaps even further narrowed—the 
holding in Goodyear.179  The Court left no doubt that a defendant is subject to 
general jurisdiction in only a limited number of places, as illustrated by the 
paradigm examples of an individual’s domicile and a corporation’s principal 
place of business or state of incorporation.180  The question no longer is one of 
“continuous and systematic” contacts as Perkins had framed it, but now is 
whether those contacts make the defendant “at home” in the forum.181  This 
point is further illustrated by the Court’s instruction that a defendant’s contacts 
with a forum must be compared to its contacts elsewhere because looking at 
contacts with the forum alone can be insufficient to determine where a defend-
ant is “at home.”182  This required analysis stands in stark contrast with Justice 
Sotomayor’s concurrence, which took no issue with the possibility of a defend-
ant being subject to general jurisdiction in virtually limitless forums.183
Third, although Daimler AG does not prohibit the exercise of general juris-
served with process during that visit, but a large corporation that owns property, employs workers, and 
does billions of dollars’ worth of business in the State will not be,” id. at 772–73 (internal citation 
omitted); and (4) “shift[ing] the risk of loss from multinational corporations to the individuals harmed 
by their actions,” id. at 773. 
177. Id. at 750 (Opinion of the Court). 
178. Indeed, the majority and Justice Sotomayor had no quibble about the correct result. 
179. See Trammell, supra note 11, at 518 (“Daimler reaffirmed the ‘at home’ test for general 
jurisdiction.  Without explicitly saying so, it also moved ever closer to the most restrictive interpreta-
tion of that standard.”).
180. Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 757–58. 
181. See Hoffheimer, supra note 5, at 582 (“The Court breaks new ground, however, with the 
announcement that the continuous and systematic affiliations required for general jurisdiction must be 
tantamount to establishing a legal home.”); Pielemeier, supra note 60, at 991 (“[A] limitation of general 
jurisdiction over corporations to places where they are ‘at home,’ appears clearly to envision fewer 
places than one could envision under tests of ‘presence,’ ‘doing business,’ and ‘continuous and sys-
tematic general business contacts.’”). 
182. Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 757, 762. 
183. Id. at 764, 769–70. 
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diction by a forum that does not fit into one of the paradigm examples, conceiv-
ing of such a forum is difficult.184  The Court cited Perkins as an example,185
but actually, the mining company in Perkins had made Ohio its temporary prin-
cipal place of business during the war, meaning that Perkins still fit within the 
Court’s paradigm examples. 
Unsurprisingly, a rule that so sharply narrowed general jurisdiction is not 
without its critics.  Some have argued that the Court ignored historical trends 
that were inconsistent with its argument.186  The rule has also been viewed as 
pro-business, allowing corporations to avoid general jurisdiction in most fo-
rums at the expense of individual plaintiffs.187  Others have criticized the rule 
as being unfair to smaller litigants.188  A theme in these criticisms is the focus 
more on the outcomes of cases under the “at home” rule,189 rather than on doc-
trinal considerations.190
C. The Narrowing Is Being Applied 
In response to Goodyear and Daimler AG, lower federal courts generally 
began applying a stricter test to determine whether a defendant was subject to 
general personal jurisdiction.191  Even a quick survey of lower federal court 
184. See Trammell, supra note 11, at 520 (“At various points throughout the opinion [in Daim-
ler], though, the Court signaled how little room there is for deviation from the paradigm examples.”). 
185. Id. (citing Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 761 n.19). 
186. Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 7, at 107 (arguing that the Court’s historical review 
“omits inconsistent trends and neglects the actual scope of judicial power exercised by state courts in 
the past” (internal footnote omitted)); see also Cox, supra note 34, at 171 (“The Daimler Court asserted 
that it was only being faithful to prior case law in imposing its restrictive test.  A restrictive approach 
to general jurisdiction, however, was not justified solely on what had been said or ruled in prior cases.” 
(internal footnote omitted)).
187. See, e.g., Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 7, at 105–06 (“Daimler is a game changer. In 
advancing the policy goal of giving corporations the power to limit states where they must answer legal 
claims, the Court shrinks the places of general jurisdiction against many large corporations to one or 
two states.”). 
188. See, e.g., Hanigan, supra note 12, at 301 (“The Court’s test breeds unfair results and under-
mines notions of ‘fair play and substantial justice.’”). 
189. See, e.g., Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 7, at 162 (“The Court’s formal rules, coupled 
with its novel metaphors, do not just prevent consideration of appropriate facts.  They tend to conceal 
the Court’s movement towards bad rules: rules that generate undesirable results for many cases.”). 
190. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 34, at 173 (“The most disappointing aspects of the Daimler
Court’s approach to general jurisdiction relate to its lack of any foundational explanation for the doc-
trine, and its unwillingness to address tensions between its assumptions and personal jurisdiction case 
law more generally.”). 
191. State courts have also taken heed, including those in North Carolina after the Supreme 
Court’s criticism of the North Carolina Court of Appeals’ analysis in Goodyear. See, e.g., Weisman v. 
Blue Mountain Organics Distribution, LLC, No. 13 CVS 3490, 2014 WL 4403105, at *5 (N.C. Super. 
Ct. Sept. 5, 2014) (applying Daimler AG and Goodyear and holding that general personal jurisdiction 
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decisions since Goodyear and Daimler shows that the “at home” rule is taking 
hold. 
For example, the Middle District of North Carolina “appl[ied] the stringent 
principles” of these new cases to hold that an Ohio corporation was not subject 
to general jurisdiction in North Carolina.192  The court focused on the defend-
ant’s contacts within the forum state compared to its contacts elsewhere, heed-
ing the Court’s instruction in Daimler AG.193
Other courts around the country have similarly been applying the “at home” 
rule.  The Eastern District of Pennsylvania noted that the rule was “more strin-
gent” than the “continuous and systematic” language of Perkins in holding that 
general jurisdiction did not exist.194  The Southern District of New York has 
made the same observation.195  Indeed, since Goodyear, courts are more fre-
quently holding that general jurisdiction does not exist.196
Although many courts are now restricting the scope of general jurisdiction, 
some courts continue to find ways to exercise their authority over out-of-state 
defendants based on general jurisdiction.197  The Southern District of Florida, 
for instance, strained to distinguish Daimler AG because finding that general 
jurisdiction did not exist “would effectively deprive American citizens from 
litigating in the United States for virtually all injuries that occur at foreign re-
sorts maintained by foreign defendants even where, as here, the corporations 
themselves maintain an American sales office in Florida and heavily market in 
the jurisdiction.”198  The Northern District of Illinois similarly used factual dis-
tinctions with Goodyear to exercise general jurisdiction over a defendant who 
was not based in that state but that “maintained regular, continuous business 
did not exist); Danius v. Sun TV Network Ltd., No. 09 CVS 18696, 2012 WL 987856, at *5 (N.C. 
Super. Ct. Mar. 22, 2012) (applying Goodyear and holding that general personal jurisdiction did not 
exist).
192. Estate of Thompson v. Mission Essential Pers., LLC, No. 1:11CV547, 2014 WL 4745947, 
at *2 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 23, 2014). 
193. Id. at *3 (explaining that “the inquiry does not rest on [d]efendant’s activity relative to the 
activity of other businesses in the state, but rather the inquiry focuses on [d]efendant’s in-state activity 
compared with the whole of [d]efendant’s own business activities”). 
194. Farber v. Tennant Truck Lines, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 3d 421, 430–33 (E.D. Pa. 2015). 
195. See SPV OSUS Ltd. v. UBS AG, 114 F. Supp. 3d 161, 167 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (noting that in 
Daimler, “the Supreme Court announced a more stringent standard for finding a corporation to be 
‘essentially at home’ in a foreign jurisdiction”). 
196. See NExTT Sols., LLC v. XOS Techs., Inc., 71 F. Supp. 3d 857, 862 (N.D. Ind. 2014) (“It 
is easier to locate examples of post-Goodyear cases finding the absence of general jurisdiction.”). 
197. See Genetin, supra note 7, at 108 (“Some lower courts, nevertheless, interpreted Goodyear
broadly and continued to permit general jurisdiction based on a defendant’s continuous and systematic 
forum contact.”).
198. Barriere v. Juluca, No. 12-23510-CIV, 2014 WL 652831, at *9 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 19, 2014). 
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contacts” and “solicit[ed] business, s[old] and market[ed] products” there.199
Cases such as these, however, appear to be in the minority, with most courts 
now applying stricter standards for general jurisdiction.200
The Supreme Court’s decisions have also led to other changes in general 
jurisdiction.  Perhaps the most noticeable is the trend away from treating a cor-
poration’s compliance with state registration statutes (that is, statutes requiring 
a business to designate an agent for service of process in a state to do business 
in that state) as a basis for exercising general jurisdiction on a theory of con-
sent.201
IV. THE MYRIAD JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Any analysis of why general jurisdiction was properly narrowed in Good-
year and Daimler AG necessarily requires a justification for why personal ju-
risdiction exists at all.  In other words, there must be a reason why a defendant 
can be sued in only certain courts.  Indeed, virtually everyone agrees that a 
person who lives in Ohio and causes a car accident in Michigan cannot be sued 
about that accident in Indiana.  But why that person cannot be sued in Indiana 
is a question without such a simple answer. 
Unsurprisingly yet unfortunately, the Supreme Court has never agreed on a 
single theory—or even necessarily compatible theories—to justify limitations 
on personal jurisdiction.202  Likewise, legal scholars are divided on this issue.203
This section examines these competing justifications for personal jurisdiction. 
The goal here is not to canvass every proffered justification (indeed, that would 
199. J.B. ex rel. Benjamin v. Abbott Labs. Inc., No. 12-CV-385, 2013 WL 452807, at *3 (N.D. 
Ill. Feb. 6, 2013). 
200. See, e.g., Vision Motor Cars, Inc. v. Valor Motor Co., 981 F. Supp. 2d 464, 473–74 
(M.D.N.C. 2013) (holding that general personal jurisdiction did not exist); Gilbarco Inc. v. Tronitec, 
Inc., No. 1:11-CV-352, 2012 WL 1020244, at *4 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 26, 2012) (same). 
201. See Pub. Impact, LLC v. Boston Consulting Grp., Inc., 117 F. Supp. 3d 732, 739 (M.D.N.C. 
2015) (“At least some courts have interpreted Daimler to mean that a defendant’s mere conformance 
with a State’s business registration statute ‘cannot constitute consent to jurisdiction’ and therefore is 
not sufficient for general jurisdiction.” (quoting AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 72 F. Supp. 
3d 549, 556  (D. Del. 2014))).
202. Cf. Cox, supra note 34, at 173 (“The most disappointing aspects of the Daimler Court’s 
approach to general jurisdiction relate to its lack of any foundational explanation for the doctrine [of 
general personal jurisdiction] . . . .”). 
203. Compare Roger H. Trangsrud, The Federal Common Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 57 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 849, 853 (1989) (arguing that consent is the basis for personal jurisdiction), with Martin 
H. Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 NW. U.
L. REV. 1112, 1115–17 (1981) (arguing that fairness and convenience is the proper basis for personal 
jurisdiction).
38800-m
qt_100-2 Sheet No. 59 Side A      02/22/2017   09:25:38
38800-mqt_100-2 Sheet No. 59 Side A      02/22/2017   09:25:38
C M
Y K
LAMBERT-P.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/17 11:37 AM
2016] THE NECESSARY NARROWING OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION 403 
take a large book).204  Instead, this Article seeks to lay out some of the most 
common justifications in Supreme Court case law. 
I have canvassed the Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction decisions (both 
specific and general) and have distilled from these cases the theories that have 
served as the basis for limiting personal jurisdiction.  The Court has not always 
identified these theories as theories per se.  Rather, these are often the concerns 
underlying the Court’s decision or articulation of a test for personal jurisdiction, 
and in some cases, multiple theories are invoked.  But even if not explicitly 
announced as theories, they can be readily identified as reasons why we have 
personal jurisdiction.
The first three theories discussed here—territoriality, fairness, and con-
sent—are the most prevalent in the Court’s case law.  Thus, they receive the 
primary attention here.  But these are not the only justifications for personal 
jurisdiction that Justices have put forth.  Four other theories have appeared 
prominently enough to warrant consideration: foreseeability, convenience of 
the defendant, the forum’s interest, and a defendant’s liberty interest. 
These justifications are not all equal.  Some are more persuasive than oth-
ers, and some have more support in case law than others.205  Fully exploring the 
relative merits of these justifications, however, is beyond the scope of this Ar-
ticle.  The goal here is not to determine which justification provides the most 
solid foundation for limiting personal jurisdiction.  Rather, this Article analyzes 
these justifications to provide a sufficient understanding of each justification to 
study general jurisdiction more closely in Part V. 
A. Territoriality 
The first of the Court’s three primary justifications for personal jurisdiction 
is territoriality.  As Pennoyer and even earlier cases made clear,206 limitations 
204. See generally Patrick J. Borchers, Jurisdictional Pragmatism: International Shoe’s Half-
Buried Legacy, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 561 (1995) (proposing a utilitarian view of personal jurisdic-
tion); Walter W. Heiser, A “Minimum Interest” Approach to Personal Jurisdiction, 35 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 915, 961 (2000) (proposing an approach to personal jurisdiction that is similar to the principles 
of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971)). 
205. One of these justifications, however, may not be sufficient by itself. See Sachs, supra note 
11, at 1314 (“The concerns listed above—convenience, fairness, and political authority—are all per-
fectly reasonable.  We want personal jurisdiction doctrines, whatever they might be, to allow suit in a 
convenient forum.  We want the burden of litigation on the defendant to be fair. And we want the 
tribunal to have legitimate authority to decide the case.  These aren’t unusual or improper wants, but 
they are incompatible.  There’s simply no way that a single doctrine of personal jurisdiction can achieve 
all these things at once.”). 
206. See, e.g., Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404, 407–08 (1855); Mills v. 
Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481, 484 (1813); The Betsey, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 6 (1794). 
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on personal jurisdiction can be based on a sovereign’s power over its terri-
tory.207  On some level, “presence” may be a better way to conceive of this 
justification.  A state’s boundary lines will affect its authority under any theory; 
what really is at issue in this justification is a defendant’s presence (whether 
actual or constructive) in a state.  Personal jurisdiction originally developed 
based on this rationale, but since International Shoe, the territorial-based justi-
fication has been discounted by some Justices208 and rejected by others.209
Despite International Shoe and academic criticism,210 the idea has not com-
pletely disappeared.  Just over a decade after International Shoe, Chief Justice 
Warren cautioned that, even in light of the “flexible standard” announced in 
that case, 
it is a mistake to assume that this trend heralds the eventual 
demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state 
courts.  Those restrictions are more than a guarantee of immun-
ity from inconvenient or distant litigation.  They are a conse-
quence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective 
States.211
And in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro212 (a case decided the same 
day as Goodyear), Justice Kennedy emphasized a sovereign’s right to exercise 
power “within its sphere.”213  Often, this concept is now framed in terms of 
federalism, ensuring that one state does not encroach too much on other 
states.214  These cases show how ideas of territoriality and presence still pervade 
personal jurisdiction.  That territoriality still appears in personal jurisdiction 
207. See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877) (“The authority of every tribunal is 
necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the State in which it is established.”); see also supra
notes 28–30 and accompanying text. 
208. See Linda S. Mullenix, Personal Jurisdiction Stops Here: Cabining the Extraterritorial 
Reach of American Courts, 45 U. TOL. L. REV. 705, 723 (2014) (referring to Pennoyer as “a theory 
somewhat discredited after” International Shoe); Sward, supra note 36, at 443–44 (“While remnants 
of the territorial theory of jurisdiction are present in the International Shoe requirement of ‘minimum 
contacts’ with the state, territorial boundaries are no longer the end of the analysis.”). 
209. See Cox, supra note 34, at 180 (“If jurisdiction was found to be legitimate without such 
territorial power, as Shoe expressly approved, then jurisdiction was not based on power but on some-
thing else.  In short, repudiating one of the inevitable results of Pennoyer’s foundational postulate 
meant that the postulate itself had been repudiated.”). 
210. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Jurisdictional Due Process and Political Theory, 39 U. FLA. L.
REV. 293, 308 (1987) (critiquing territoriality as a justification for personal jurisdiction). 
211. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958) (internal citation omitted). 
212. 564 U.S. 873 (2011). 
213. Id. at 879. 
214. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (observing 
that personal jurisdiction “acts to ensure that the States through their courts, do not reach out beyond 
the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system”). 
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jurisprudence is unsurprising, given the role of both originalism215 and inertia216
in legal thought. 
Other Justices, however, sought to limit the impact of territoriality.  Justice 
Marshall, for instance, tried to minimize Chief Justice Warren’s language from 
Hanson v. Denckla217 on the role of territoriality in justifying jurisdiction by 
characterizing that language as “simply mak[ing] the point that the States are 
defined by their geographical territory.”218  And as recently as Daimler AG,
Justice Ginsburg gave little weight to cases that relied on “Pennoyer’s territorial 
thinking.”219
B. Fairness 
The Court’s second major theory of personal jurisdiction is fairness, a view 
first announced by Chief Justice Stone in International Shoe.  The now-famous 
language of ensuring sufficient contacts that “the maintenance of the suit does 
not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice’” encapsulates 
this concept.220  At its core, this rule is about a court’s belief that the exercise 
of jurisdiction is reasonable.221  It requires a “defendant-focused” analysis of 
the contacts between the defendant and the forum to determine if those contacts 
are sufficient to permit the forum to issue a binding judgment against the de-
fendant.222
215. Originalism has really developed as a legal movement since the late twentieth century. See
Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism As A Theory of Legal Change, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 817, 822–
38 (2015) (discussing various forms of originalism).  But looking to the original meaning of legal rules 
is far older than this current movement. Cf. Reagan v. United States, 157 U.S. 301, 303 (1895) (going 
back to English law to determine the meaning of the word “felonies”). 
216.  See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2148 
(2002) (observing that “[c]onstitutional law changes slowly”). 
217. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). 
218. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977). 
219. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761 n.18 (2014). 
220. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 
U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
221. See, e.g., J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 903 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dis-
senting) (“The modern approach to jurisdiction over corporations and other legal entities, ushered in 
by International Shoe, gave prime place to reason and fairness.”); Patrick J. Borchers, J. McIntyre 
Machinery, Goodyear, and the Incoherence of the Minimum Contacts Test, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV.
1245, 1264 (2011) (arguing that “International Shoe was an opinion entirely about fairness and not 
state sovereignty”). 
222. Peter L. Markowitz & Lindsay C. Nash, Constitutional Venue, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1153, 1194 
(2014); see also Davis v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 294 F.2d 641, 647 (4th Cir. 1961) (analyzing 
personal jurisdiction by focusing on the Texas-based defendant being required to litigate in North Car-
olina).
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The minimum contacts test that represents this concept of fairness is ubiq-
uitous in the Court’s case law since 1945.  Virtually every Justice who has writ-
ten a personal jurisdiction opinion has quoted or cited this portion of Interna-
tional Shoe, from those like Justice Brennan223 and Justice Marshall224 who 
emphatically rejected ideas from the Court’s pre-International Shoe decisions
to those like Justice Scalia who readily embraced the relevance of Pennoyer’s
teaching for modern jurisprudence.225  Regardless of the esteem in which these 
Justices held older cases, they recognized that the minimum contacts test pro-
vided greater flexibility for courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over defend-
ants located outside of the forum, a necessity in an increasingly mobile soci-
ety.226
This idea often serves as the starting point for the analysis in each case, 
even when Justices reach opposite conclusions.  For instance, in World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,227 Justice White wrote for the Court, holding 
that an automobile distributor and retailer from New York was not subject to 
personal jurisdiction in Oklahoma.228  Justice Marshall and Justice Brennan 
both dissented, arguing that personal jurisdiction should exist.229  All three Jus-
tices, however, based their decision on International Shoe’s minimum contacts 
test.230 Helicopteros saw a similar pattern: Justice Blackmun’s opinion for the 
223. See, e.g., Burnham v. Super. Ct., 495 U.S. 604, 630 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (quoting International Shoe’s minimum contact language and rejecting Pennoyer).
224. See generally Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) (relying on International Shoe’s lan-
guage to reject the reasoning of Pennoyer for in rem jurisdiction). 
225. See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 616–18 (Opinion of the Court) (relying on Pennoyer in interpret-
ing the meaning of minimum contacts). 
226. See, e.g., Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 753 (2014) (“In time, however, that strict 
territorial approach yielded to a less rigid understanding, spurred by ‘changes in the technology of 
transportation and communication, and the tremendous growth of interstate business activity.’” (quot-
ing Burnham, 495 U.S. at 617). 
227. 444 U.S. 286 (1980). 
228. Id. at 299. 
229. Id. at 312–13 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 317 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
230. See id. at 291 (Opinion of the Court); id. at 299 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 313 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting).The fact that Justices routinely start with the minimum contacts test yet regularly 
reach different results is an undeniable problem with the Court’s framework for personal jurisdiction.  
Justice Black actually predicted that confusion would follow the Court’s decision in International
Shoe. See case cited supra note 65.This lack of clarity has serious consequences for litigants. See, e.g.,
Winton D. Woods, Burnham v. Superior Court: New Wine, Old Bottles, 13 GEO. MASON U. L. REV.
199, 203 (1990); cf. Wm. Grayson Lambert, Focusing on Fulfilling the Goals: Rethinking How Choice-
of-Law Regimes Approach Statutes of Limitations, 65 SYRACUSE L. REV. 491, 531 (2015) (“By having 
a clear rule about which statute of limitations applies, a potential defendant knows with certainty that 
either the defendant can be sued for some action or cannot be sued for that action—a clear rule leaves 
no doubt.  If a defendant knows that a statute of limitations has run, the defendant can therefore move 
forward with various affairs, confident that a plaintiff could bring suit.  But if the statute of limitations 
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Court and Justice Brennan’s dissent both started with International Shoe, but 
they reached different conclusions on whether jurisdiction existed.231
C. Consent 
The third common justification for personal jurisdiction in the Court’s ju-
risprudence is consent.  Consent-based theories are at the core of American po-
litical thought, serving as the foundation of political theories that culminated in 
the Constitution and that continue to influence how Americans conceive of their 
political life, so that these ideas appear in the Court’s reasoning is unsurpris-
ing.232
Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion in Nicastro provides a classic example 
of consent in personal jurisdiction cases.  As that was a specific jurisdiction 
case, Justice Kennedy used language from that line of jurisprudence, writing: 
“As a general rule, the sovereign’s exercise of power requires some act by 
which the defendant ‘purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting 
activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of 
its laws.’”233  On a most basic level, this idea of consent asks “whether the de-
fendant’s activities manifest an intention to submit to the power of a sover-
eign.”234  Various ways a defendant could consent to personal jurisdiction in-
clude express consent, being physically served with process in the forum, and 
has not run, the defendant can know that the possibility of a lawsuit remains and must plan accord-
ingly.”).
231. Compare Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414–18 (1984) 
(holding, based on International Shoe, that jurisdiction did not exist), with id. at 420 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (arguing, based on International Shoe, that jurisdiction did exist). 
232. See, e.g., Trangsrud, supra note 203, at 885 (1989) (discussing the consent-based nature of 
the American Constitution).  For an example of influential pre-Revolution social-contract thinking, see 
generally JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 
1988) (1690).  As one illustration of how consent and the social contract influence the Founders, John 
Adams wrote in 1776, “It is certain, in theory, that the only moral foundation of government is, the 
consent of the people.”  Letter from John Adams to James Sullivan (May 26, 1776), reprinted in 9 
CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 375 (1854).Consent has generated substan-
tial debates among legal scholars. For examples of scholars who argue that consent is a legitimate basis 
for exercising personal jurisdiction, see generally Richard A. Epstein, Consent, Not Power, as the Basis 
for Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. L. F. 1, 1–3 and Trangsrud, supra note 203.  For examples of those 
scholars who fervently disagree, see generally Lea Brilmayer, Consent, Contract, and Territory, 74 
MINN. L. REV. 1 (1989), and Pamela J. Stephens, Sovereignty and Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine: Up 
the Stream of Commerce Without A Paddle, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 105 (1991). 
233. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 880 (2011) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 
357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). 
234. Id. at 882.Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Nicastro criticized this theory, calling it “unneces-
sary and unhelpful.” Id. at 901 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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citizenship in the forum.235
Consent, however, is nothing new to the Court’s personal jurisdiction juris-
prudence.  It appears in much earlier cases, such as Lafayette Insurance Co. v. 
French,236 in which the Court held that an Indiana-based insurance company 
had consented to jurisdiction in Ohio by registering to do business in the 
state.237
Often, consent appears in the Court’s decisions as an exchange-based con-
cept, including in International Shoe itself.238  This expression of consent was 
perhaps most plainly stated in Justice Brennan’s concurrence in Burnham.  In 
that opinion, Justice Brennan argued that the defendant had implicitly con-
sented to personal jurisdiction in the forum by being present there and taking 
advantage of the state’s protections: “[The defendant’s] health and safety are 
guaranteed by the State’s police, fire, and emergency medical services; he is 
free to travel on the State’s roads and waterways; he likely enjoys the fruits of 
the State’s economy as well.”239
Consent also serves as the reason that the Court has held that defendants 
can waive personal jurisdiction as a defense.  In Burger King Corp. v. Rudze-
wicz,240 for example, Justice Brennan noted that parties can voluntarily submit 
their disputes to a decisionmaker.241 This idea repeatedly appears in the Court’s 
decisions.242
D. Foreseeability 
I now turn to justifications that have appeared with some regularity in the 
Court’s jurisprudence but that have not been as prominent as territoriality, fair-
ness, or consent. 
The first theory in this second tier is foreseeability.  Like fairness, this jus-
tification is also rooted in reasonableness.243  This justification focuses less on 
235. Id. at 880 (Opinion of the Court). 
236. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1855). 
237. Id. at 407–08. 
238. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (noting the protections and 
benefits that a defendant may enjoy from its activities in a forum). 
239. Burnham v. Super. Ct., 495 U.S. 604, 637–38 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judg-
ment). 
240. 471 U.S. 462 (1985). 
241. Id. at 472 n.14. 
242. See, e.g., Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 704 (1982) 
(noting that the Court had previously “upheld the personal jurisdiction of a District Court on the basis 
of a stipulation entered into by the defendant”); cf. Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 
484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987) (discussing consent in the context of service of process). 
243. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 882 (2011) (“In Asahi, an opinion 
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the defendant’s contacts with the forum and more on whether the defendant 
“should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.”244  This focus on 
expectations, rather than relationships, is what fundamentally distinguishes this 
theory from the fairness justification. 
Foreseeability has been championed most vigorously by Justice Brennan,245
who had a very broad conception of when jurisdiction was foreseeable.246  Jus-
tice Brennan focused heavily on this concept in his majority opinion in Burger
King,247 as well as in his concurring opinion in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. 
Superior Court,248 in which he argued that the majority was retreating from its 
earlier views on foreseeability.249
Despite Justice Brennan’s best efforts,250 foreseeability has never taken 
hold as a central theory for personal jurisdiction.  Even before Justice Brennan’s 
most vigorous arguments on this concept, the Court had held that “‘foreseea-
bility’ alone has never been a sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction 
under the Due Process Clause.”251  And in Nicastro, Justice Kennedy confirmed 
that foreseeability was a test that the Court had never adopted.252
by Justice Brennan for four Justices outlined a different approach. It discarded the central concept of 
sovereign authority in favor of considerations of fairness and foreseeability.”).
244. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). 
245. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 116–21 (1987) (Brennan, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
246. See Cox, supra note 34, at 194 (“Justice Brennan’s version of equating choice-of-law and 
personal jurisdiction meant that he never saw a case where he did not want to assert personal jurisdic-
tion and seldom found unconstitutional any application of forum law.” (internal footnote omitted)). 
247. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985) (discussing the role of 
foreseeability in the due process analysis). 
248. 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
249. Id. at 118–19 (Brennan, J. concurring in the judgment). 
250. As a careful reading of this Part shows, Justice Brennan was often on the losing end of 
personal jurisdiction cases, leading one scholar to call him “the great dissenter” in these cases. Howard 
B. Stravitz, Sayonara to Fair Play and Substantial Justice?, 63 S.C. L. REV. 745, 751 (2012). 
251. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980).This was a point 
Justice Brennan himself had to concede as much in his opinion in Burger King. See Burger King Corp.,
471 U.S. at 474 (“Although it has been argued that foreseeability of causing injury in another State 
should be sufficient to establish such contacts there when policy considerations so require, the Court 
has consistently held that this kind of foreseeability is not a ‘sufficient benchmark’ for exercising per-
sonal jurisdiction.” (internal footnote omitted)). 
252. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 883 (2011) (“But Justice Brennan’s 
concurrence, advocating a rule based on general notions of fairness and foreseeability, is inconsistent 
with the premises of lawful judicial power.  This Court’s precedents make clear that it is the defendant’s 
actions, not his expectations, that empower a State’s courts to subject him to judgment.”). 
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E. Convenience of the Defendant 
Another less prominent justification from the Court is the convenience of 
the defendant.  The Supreme Court has held that “jurisdictional rules may not 
be employed in such a way as to make litigation ‘so gravely difficult and incon-
venient’ that a party unfairly is at a ‘severe disadvantage’ in comparison to his 
opponent.”253  The Court tied this rule to International Shoe, explaining that 
“even if the defendant has purposefully engaged in forum activities,” forcing 
the defendant to litigate in a distant forum may still violate due process.254
Typically this theory is invoked as a secondary or additional reason in an 
opinion.255  For example, in Asahi Metal Industry Co., Justice O’Connor spent 
the bulk of the plurality opinion focused on minimum contacts, as explained by 
the idea of a purposeful availment.256  Yet at the end, in the concluding sum-
mary of the Court’s analysis, Justice O’Connor referred to the burden of the 
Japanese-based defendant litigating this case in a California court as an addi-
tional reason that personal jurisdiction did not exist.257
This idea received greater weight from Justice White in World-Wide 
Volkswagen.  He pointed to protecting a defendant from “the burdens of litigat-
ing in a distant or inconvenient forum” as one of the functions of personal ju-
risdiction.258  He actually framed this burden argument as a part of the mini-
mum-contacts test, connecting these ideas through International Shoe’s
language of “fair play.”259  Still, litigating in an inconvenient forum was not the 
253. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 478 (quoting Mcgee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 
223 (1957) and M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 18 (1972)). 
254. Id. at 477–78; see also United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 828 (1984) (stating that 
“personal jurisdiction protects the individual interest that is implicated when a nonresident defendant 
is haled into a distant and possibly inconvenient forum”); Davis v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 294 
F.2d 641, 647 (4th Cir. 1961) (considering the burden on an out-of-state defendant to litigate in the 
forum). 
255. Some scholars have advocated this justification. For instance, Professor Redish has argued 
that it should be the basis of determining when personal jurisdiction exists. See Redish, supra note 203, 
at 1115.  But as Professor Stein notes, the idea “has had relatively little traction” in the Court’s deci-
sions.  Stein, supra note 5, at 535.
256. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 111–13 (1987). 
257. See id. at 116 (noting “the heavy burden on the alien defendant” of litigating in Califor-
nia).For other examples of the Court relying on the convenience of the defendant, see Burger King 
Corp., 471 U.S. at 477 (noting that one factor a court may consider in its due process analysis for 
personal jurisdiction is the “burden on the defendant”), and Morton, 467 U.S. at 828 (explaining that 
“personal jurisdiction protects the individual interest that is implicated when a nonresident defendant 
is haled into a distant and possibly inconvenient forum”). 
258. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980). 
259. Id.
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core of this opinion, and it was subsumed under the concept of fairness.260  And 
even when the burden on a defendant was separately considered as something 
that could potentially defeat personal jurisdiction despite a defendant’s mini-
mum contacts with the forum,261 this consideration was still secondary to min-
imum contacts, and it is clear that such a case would be the exception. 
Moreover, the idea of an inconvenient forum has been minimized—or flatly 
rejected—in other cases as the focus of personal jurisdiction.  Chief Justice 
Warren in Hanson took the view that personal jurisdiction is “more than a guar-
antee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation” and represents a limit 
on the power of a court.262  As Chief Justice Warren’s position shows, conven-
ience of the defendant has never been fully embraced by the Court as a signifi-
cant justification for personal jurisdiction,263 but its role in influencing the 
Court’s decision-making is undeniable. 
F. The Forum’s Interest 
Another secondary justification that the Court has offered at times is the 
forum’s interest in exercising jurisdiction.264  This justification is rooted in the 
idea that a state, as a sovereign with a duty to protect its citizens and promote 
justice, has a need to ensure that injured individuals have recourse, guilty indi-
viduals are forced to right their wrongs, and not guilty individuals are not un-
fairly required to pay for someone else’s wrongdoing.265
260. Id. at 291–99. 
261. See Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 477–78.Some scholars have interpreted the Court’s 
decisions in World-Wide Volkswagen and Burger King as adopting a two-branch approach to personal 
jurisdiction: first, whether the defendant has minimum contacts with the forum; and second, if so, 
whether the presumption of personal jurisdiction is overcome by convenience and burden factors. See
Stravitz, supra note 250, at 750–55. 
262. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958). 
263. The three most prominent theories have certainly been limited or deemphasized by Justices 
in various cases, but these opinions recognize the significant role that these theories have played in the 
case law.  Chief Justice Warren’s point was different: convenience had simply never played such a 
significant role in personal jurisdiction cases. Id. at 251. 
264. Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 126, at 265 (“The state’s interest in protecting its citizens 
lies at the heart of the adjudicatory system; jurisdictional limits that counteract the state’s ability to 
enforce its legislative priorities necessarily erode the judicial safeguards within our federal system.”). 
265. See Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 473 (“We have noted several reasons why a forum 
legitimately may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who ‘purposefully directs’ his ac-
tivities toward forum residents.  A State generally has a ‘manifest interest’ in providing its residents 
with a convenient forum for redressing injuries inflicted by out-of-state actors.”); cf. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
(“We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure 
domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the 
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the 
United States of America.”). 
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The unique aspect of this theory is that Justices have generally agreed on 
the limited role that it can play in determining whether personal jurisdiction 
exists, whereas Justices have heatedly debated what role, if any, other justifica-
tions should have.266  The Court has repeatedly recognized the circumscribed 
role for the forum’s interest in personal jurisdiction analysis.  For example, in 
Kulko v. Superior Court,267 Justice Marshall stated that the forum’s interest in 
exercising jurisdiction was “to be considered,” but he indicated that it was less 
important than the “essential criterion” of whether the exercise of jurisdiction 
was fair to the defendant.268  And in World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court noted 
that the burden on the defendant must be “considered in light of other relevant 
factors,” including the forum’s interest in deciding the case.269  Although the 
Court has noted that the weight of the forum’s interest in the jurisdictional anal-
ysis may vary depending on the facts of the case, it has consistently given this 
theory a minor role in its analysis.270
The limitations on this justification were shown most clearly in Nicastro.
In that case, the plaintiff injured his hand in a metal-shearing machine manu-
factured by the defendant, an English company, and he sued that manufacturer 
in New Jersey state court.271  In holding that the defendant was not subject to 
personal jurisdiction in New Jersey, the Court acknowledged the New Jersey 
Supreme Court’s argument that the state claimed a “strong interest in protecting 
its citizens from defective products.”272  This interest alone, however, was in-
sufficient to permit the exercise of personal jurisdiction.273  This case thus il-
lustrates how the forum’s interest can support a conclusion about whether per-
sonal jurisdiction exists, but it is not sufficient for the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction.
G. A Defendant’s Liberty Interest 
The last of the second-tier theories of personal jurisdiction—a defendant’s 
liberty interest—is different than the preceding three.  For the first three, the 
266. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 478; Kulko v. Super. Ct., 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978). 
267. 436 U.S. 84 (1978). 
268. Id. at 92. 
269. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980). 
270. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987) (“When minimum con-
tacts have been established, often the interests of the plaintiff and the forum in the exercise of jurisdic-
tion will justify even the serious burdens placed on the alien defendant.”). 
271. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 878 (2011). 
272. Id. at 887 (quoting Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd., 987 A.2d 575, 590 (N.J. 2010)). 
273. Id.
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ideas were ones that the Court had never fully embraced as the core of an opin-
ion.  Some Justices had advocated for the idea, or the idea was a secondary 
consideration.  But for this last justification, the Court has, in one decision, 
based its decision squarely on that justification. 
The Court relied on this rationale as the core of its reasoning in Insurance
Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee.274  The Court there, in 
an opinion by Justice White, contrasted personal jurisdiction with subject-mat-
ter jurisdiction, noting that while subject-matter jurisdiction is a restriction on 
judicial power, personal jurisdiction “recognizes and protects an individual lib-
erty interest.”275  This difference was highlighted by the fact that personal ju-
risdiction is tied to the Due Process Clause, rather than to Article III.276
This case was the first time that the Court invoked this liberty theory of 
personal jurisdiction.  Since that time, the idea has appeared in other decisions 
but never again as the central piece of the Court’s analysis.  In Burger King 
Corp., the Court introduced its analysis with this liberty point, but it never re-
turned to it.277  The idea appeared in Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Nicastro but 
only in a small role in the latter part of the Court’s analysis.278
***
These seven theories, each of which is based on due process,279 represent 
the most prominent ideas for justifying limits on personal jurisdiction.280  The 
274. 456 U.S. 694, 702–04 (1982). 
275. Id. at 702. 
276. Id. (“The requirement that a court have personal jurisdiction flows not from Art. III, but 
from the Due Process Clause.”). 
277. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 & n.13 (1985). 
278. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd., 564 U.S. at 884.The Court has pointed to the language from 
Insurance Corp. of Ireland in other contexts outside of personal jurisdiction, including in deciding 
whether a federal court may determine personal jurisdiction before subject-matter jurisdiction, see
Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 584 (1999), and in choice-of-law issues, see Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 807 (1985). 
279.  Given the existence of personal jurisdiction prior to the Fourteenth Amendment’s adoption, 
as well as other problems in personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, we must recognize that the personal 
jurisdiction is actually rooted in something other than the Due Process Clause.  Ever since International
Shoe, however, courts have treated as gospel the idea that personal jurisdiction is a due process-based 
concept.  Challenging that concept is beyond the scope of this Article, but it is an issue I will tackle in 
a forthcoming article.
280. One concept not discussed here is the idea that general jurisdiction always ensures that the 
plaintiff has a forum in which to bring a lawsuit.  See, e.g., Hoffheimer, supra note 5, at 592 (“In some 
cases, however, where specific jurisdiction is not available, general jurisdiction provides the only form 
of jurisdiction.”); Twitchell, supra note 22, at 631 (“First, and most important, its provision of a place 
where a defendant may be sued on any cause of action may serve a legitimate societal need not met by 
other jurisdiction theories.”); see also Tire Eng’g & Distribution, LLC v. Shandong Linglong Rubber 
Co., 682 F.3d 292, 303 (4th Cir. 2012) (“The burden on the defendant, interests of the forum state, and 
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theories often lead to similar conclusions, but that is not always the case.  The 
Court has never fully settled on one of these theories for why we have personal 
jurisdiction, and its most recent cases offer little hope that a consensus is immi-
nent.281  Accordingly, each of the justifications discussed in this Part may well 
play a role in subsequent personal jurisdiction cases, which means that the im-
pact of the “at home” rule on each of them must be considered. 
V. JUSTIFYING THE NARROWING OF GENERAL JURISDICTION
Having observed the narrowing of general personal jurisdiction in Good-
year and Daimler AG and considered the justifications for limiting personal 
jurisdiction at all, this Part explains why the “at home” rule is a positive juris-
prudential development for personal jurisdiction.  First, it is a clear rule that can 
be easily applied.  Second, it is a logically coherent rule that promotes more 
consistent results: regardless of which justification for personal jurisdiction one 
prefers, the “at home” rule fits nicely into that framework as a logical limitation 
on where a defendant may be sued.  In other words, the “at home” rule ensures 
that general jurisdiction is built on a foundation of rock, rather than sand, and 
is better able to withstand close scrutiny.282
A. The Necessary Narrowing of General Jurisdiction 
As the doctrine had developed after Perkins and Helicopteros, general ju-
risdiction permitted a defendant to be haled into a court about any matter—even 
the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief guide our inquiry [regarding personal jurisdiction].”  (empha-
sis added)).  This plaintiff-centric focus stands in stark contrast with the every other theory, which is 
defendant-focused.  Moreover, this plaintiff-centric idea has never played a significant role in the 
Court’s decisionmaking, particularly with regard to general jurisdiction. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires 
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 929–30 n.5 (2011) (explaining that “[g]eneral jurisdiction to 
adjudicate has in [United States] practice never been based on the plaintiff’s relationship to the forum” 
(alterations in original) (quoting von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, supra note 18, at 1137)); Keeton 
v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779 (1984) (explaining the minimal role that the plaintiff’s
connection with the forum has in the jurisdictional analysis); Twitchell, supra note 22, at 633 (“If 
general jurisdiction is truly dispute-blind, its sole focus should be the nature of a defendant’s forum 
contacts.  Whether general jurisdiction can be exercised in a particular case should turn on the nature 
of those contacts and their relevance to the underlying concern of due process.”).
281. Hoffheimer, supra note 5, at 594. 
282. Cf. Matthew 7:24–27 (“Everyone then who hears these words of mine and does them will 
be like a wise man who built his house on the rock.  And the rain fell, and the floods came, and the 
winds blew and beat on that house, but it did not fall, because it had been founded on the rock.  And 
everyone who hears these words of mine and does not do them will be like a foolish man who built his 
house on the sand.  And the rain fell, and the floods came, and the winds blew and beat against that 
house, and it fell, and great was the fall of it.”). 
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those completely unrelated to that forum—as long as the defendant had suffi-
cient continuous and systematic contacts with that forum.283  No longer is that 
possible under Goodyear and Daimler AG; instead, the defendant must be “at 
home” in the forum.284  This Section explains why, regardless of one’s preferred 
justification for limiting personal jurisdiction, this “at home” requirement is a 
positive development for personal jurisdiction. 
1. The “At Home” Rule Is Clear
 Given the continuing relevance and the power of general jurisdiction,285
courts and litigants need and deserve a sound doctrine.  One part of a sound 
doctrine is ensuring that it is clear and predictable.  Such a rule allows individ-
uals and businesses to order their affairs and have rational expectations about 
where potential disputes could be resolved.286  It also helps minimize expensive 
litigation over non-merits issues.287
The need for clear rules for jurisdictional issues is particularly acute.  It is 
a point that the Supreme Court has made repeatedly in a variety of contexts.288
283. See, e.g., Drive Fin. Servs., LP v. Ginsburg, No. 3:06 CV 1288 G, 2007 WL 2084113, at *7 
(N.D. Tex. July 19, 2007) (noting the “sweeping exercise of jurisdiction” permitted by general juris-
diction).
284. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 751 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, 
S.A., 564 U.S. at 929. 
285. Some scholars predicted that “general jurisdiction would diminish in importance as the Su-
preme Court embraced a more robust role for specific jurisdiction.”  Trammell, supra note 11, at 507 
(citing von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, supra note 18, at 1144; Twitchell, supra note 22, at 628, 
676).  Even if it is not as prominent as specific jurisdiction, it remains significant, as Goodyear and
Daimler AG show. And even if specific jurisdiction is more commonly invoked, that does not have 
any bearing the doctrine of general jurisdiction itself. See Cox, supra note 34, at 174 (“A dramatic rise 
in the number of specific jurisdiction cases does not automatically explain why there should be a short-
ening of general jurisdiction reach.”). 
286. See Twitchell, supra note 22, at 676 (“If certainty is a valid goal, the most important char-
acteristic of dispute-blind jurisdiction should be clarity.  The parties need clear and precise criteria for 
determining when such jurisdiction is available, both before and after a claim arises.”); cf. Lambert,
supra note 230, at 530–34 (arguing that a clear, predictable rule is best for determining which state’s 
statute of limitations applies). 
287. See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of Personal Jurisdiction: 
From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 19, 103 (1990) (“The real social 
costs are a consequence of the convoluted doctrine that engenders expensive litigation before the par-
ties even get to the starting gate.”). 
288. See, e.g., Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1133 (2015) (noting “the rule that 
‘[j]urisdictional rules should be clear’” (alteration in original) (quoting Grable & Sons Metal Products, 
Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 321 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring))).Perhaps this 
point was most colorfully made in a concurring opinion by Justice Thomas, who lamented the blurring 
of admiralty jurisdiction this way: 
It is especially unfortunate that this has occurred in admiralty, an area that once 
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And it is a point that scholars have noted with regularity.289  Ironically, the 
Court has recognized that the “fair play and substantial justice” standard “pre-
clude[s] clear-cut jurisdictional rules.”290  Bringing clarity to personal jurisdic-
tion would therefore be a significant improvement. 
Typically, a clear rule is a straightforward rule.  As one federal court has 
observed, a “bright-line rule serves important jurisdictional and procedural pur-
poses [because] it brings certainty and predictability.”291  The best bright-line, 
straightforward rules are “[s]imple” ones that are easily interpreted and ap-
plied.292
The “at home” test checks this box.  Indeed, establishing this fact is as easy 
as applying the rule itself.  Although the rule may require some litigation in rare 
instances,293 it will provide a clear answer in the vast majority of cases, in light 
of the Supreme Court’s “paradigm” examples of an individual’s domicile and 
a corporation’s principal place of business or state of incorporation as the limits 
of when a defendant is subject to general jurisdiction.294  These are, as the Court 
noted, unique locations that should be easy to identify.295  Little time and few 
resources should therefore be spent on resolving whether a defendant is at 
home, and thus, subject to general jurisdiction in a particular forum.  This is in 
stark contrast with the former rule for general jurisdiction, which required an 
evaluation of how substantial a defendant’s contacts were with the forum with 
provided a jurisdictional rule almost as clear as the 9th and 10th verses of Gene-
sis: “And God said, Let the waters under the heaven be gathered together unto 
one place, and let the dry land appear: and it was so.  And God called the dry land 
Earth; and the gathering together of the waters called the Seas: and God saw that 
it was good.” 
Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 549–50 (1995) (quoting 
Genesis 1:9–10). 
289. See, e.g., Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Clarity and Clarification: Grable Federal Questions in 
the Eyes of Their Beholders, 91 NEB. L. REV. 387, 388 (2012) (“Jurists and commentators have re-
peated for centuries the refrain that jurisdictional rules should be clear.”). 
290. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 486 n.29 (1985). 
291. Reyes v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., No. 1:14-CV-00964 MJS, 2014 WL 3938865, at *3 (E.D. 
Cal. Aug. 11, 2014). 
292. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94 (2010) (“Simple jurisdictional rules . . . promote 
greater predictability.”). 
293. See, e.g., Kinsman v. Fla. St. Univ. Bd. of Trs., No. 6:15-CV-16-Orl-31KRS, 2015 WL 
11110542, at *4–5 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 27, 2015) (holding that the university was not “at home” in the 
Middle District of Florida and transferring the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1406 to the Northern District of 
Florida, which encompasses Tallahassee). 
294. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014); see also id. (“These bases afford plain-
tiffs recourse to at least one clear and certain forum in which a corporate defendant may be sued on 
any and all claims.”). 
295. Id.
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no bright-line test for when those contacts were substantial enough for general 
jurisdiction to exist. 
2. The “At Home” Rule Is Logically Coherent
A logically coherent rule is also important as part of a sound doctrine.  Such
a rule produces internally consistent results that comport with the theory that 
justifies limitations on personal jurisdiction in the first place.  This type of rule 
is important both to ensure that litigants in a particular case get an equitable 
result296 and to promote courts as legitimate dispute-resolution systems for so-
ciety generally.297  The “at home” rule is internally consistent under any theo-
retical foundation of personal jurisdiction. 
Significantly, this Part does not make any normative evaluations of any of 
these theories; it does not seek to determine whether each theory is better than 
the others.  The focus then is whether the “at home” rule makes each justifica-
tion more logically sound, regardless of whether it is ultimately more persua-
sive than other justifications.  
First, starting with territoriality, any consideration of this justification must 
recall the era in which the justification was most prominent.  People typically 
traveled only short distances, and many never left their home state.298  Thus, the 
common understanding was that people would be sued on any matter in the 
state where they resided.  In some sense, the “at home” test thus reaches back 
to the effect of personal jurisdiction rules as they existed before International
Shoe, limiting general jurisdiction to its original scope (at least in the vast ma-
jority of cases). 
Of course, under this justification, a person historically can be sued wher-
ever the person is found,299 which is in conflict with the “at home” test: under 
this justification, a person served within the state (while stopped at an Interstate 
rest stop, for example) is subject to general jurisdiction in the state, even if that 
state is not the person’s domicile.  Whether this historical vestige of Pennoyer
296. See Lambert, supra note 230, at 501 (discussing the importance of deciding cases accu-
rately).Reaching a fair result is especially important with general jurisdiction because of the doctrine’s 
“deep bite.” Genetin, supra note 7, at 113 (citing von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, supra note 18, 
at 1143–44, 1177–79). 
297. Cf. Wm. Grayson Lambert, Note, The Real Debate over the Senate’s Role in the Confirma-
tion Process, 61 DUKE L.J. 1283, 1317 (2012) (“The rule of law embodies values such as consistency, 
stability, predictability, and transparency.”). 
298. See supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text. 
299. See Burnham v. Super. Ct., 495 U.S. 604, 628 (1990) (holding that “the Due Process Clause 
does not prohibit the California courts from exercising jurisdiction over petitioner based on the fact of 
in-state service of process”). 
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remains valid is debatable,300 but the core of the territorial justification aligns 
nicely with the “at home” test, as it ties general jurisdiction to a defendant’s 
home forum and prevents other forums from exercising this tremendous power 
over the defendant that the “continuous and systematic” framework permitted. 
Second, turning to fairness, this justification also supports limiting the 
scope of general jurisdiction to a defendant’s home forum.  From one perspec-
tive (such as Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in Daimler AG), this analysis 
should focus “solely on the magnitude of the defendant’s in-state contacts.”301
Under this view, a defendant that operates significant business throughout the 
country could be sued about anything anywhere.  According to Justice So-
tomayor, this result is simply “the nature of the global economy.”302  It means 
that a customer in a McDonald’s restaurant in Vermont who spilt hot coffee on 
himself can sue in Iowa about that incident, or a child running through a Home 
Depot in Oregon who has a display door fall on him can sue for his injuries in 
a Georgia court. 
But this view is not necessarily consistent with International Shoe.  As an 
initial matter, treating such suits that more logically belong in another state as 
merely a question of venue is insufficient.  For one, venue and personal juris-
diction are different concepts, with venue being relevant only after personal 
jurisdiction is established.303  And for another, treating this issue as one of venue 
significantly reduces a defendant’s protections.304  Even if such a case could be 
transferred under 28 U.S.C. § 1404,305 a decision whether to transfer a case is 
reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion rather than de novo,306 and it could 
result in different state’s law applying to the case.307
300. See Cox, supra note 34, at 187–92 (arguing that Burnham was wrongly decided in light of 
International Shoe).  Even if Burnham was rightly decided at the time, it is unclear whether that deci-
sion survives Goodyear and Daimler AG. See, e.g., Stein, supra note 5, at 548–49. 
301. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 767 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judg-
ment). 
302. Id. at 771. 
303. See Twitchell, supra note 22, at 666–67. 
304. Id. at 667. 
305. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2011) (“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest 
of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might 
have been brought or to any district or division to which all parties have consented.”). 
306. Compare Trs. of the Plumbers & Pipefitters Nat’l Pension Fund v. Plumbing Servs., Inc., 
791 F.3d 436, 443 (4th Cir. 2015) (“We review decisions on whether to transfer venue under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1404 for abuse of discretion.”), with CFA Inst. v. Inst. of Chartered Fin. Analysts of India, 551 F.3d
285, 292 (4th Cir. 2009) (“We assess de novo whether the district court possessed personal jurisdiction 
over the defendant in this proceeding.”). 
307. See Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 519 (1990) (requiring a transferee court to 
apply the law of the transferor court when a case is transferred under § 1404(a), even when the plaintiff 
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More fundamentally, too broad a view of when exercising general jurisdic-
tion is fair threatens to obliterate the distinction between general and specific 
jurisdiction.  In adopting the minimum contacts standard in International Shoe,
the Court contemplated roles for both general and specific jurisdiction.308  But 
if general jurisdiction is nothing more than having more (even many more) con-
tacts than specific jurisdiction, the two concepts are different only in degree, 
rather than in kind.  The “at home” rule makes these concepts truly distinct by 
recognizing their different functions.  Specific jurisdiction makes the judicial 
system more functional in a cross-border society, and general jurisdiction rec-
ognizes the unique relationship between a defendant and its home or headquar-
ters.
Third, if consent is used to justify personal jurisdiction, the issue is in which 
state an individual or a corporation agrees to be sued about anything.  Although 
individuals and corporations would presumably want not to have to consent to 
suit anywhere, that is unrealistic.  Because the Supreme Court has recognized 
the validity of general jurisdiction, we have to assume that a U.S.-based defend-
ant must consent to general jurisdiction in at least one jurisdiction. 
As a theoretical matter, one can safely assume that anyone would want to 
limit the places where he could be sued on any matter; after all, why would 
anyone agree to have more places to defend litigation? Practical experience re-
inforces this theory: defendants routinely fight personal jurisdiction in distant, 
inconvenient, or unfriendly forums, despite the fact that litigating a non-merits 
issue can be expensive.309  This idea is illustrated by Goodyear, when the U.S.-
based defendant did not fight jurisdiction, while the European-based defendants 
did.310
The next question is in what state an individual or corporation would choose 
to consent to general jurisdiction.  The logical answer is the state where the 
individual or corporation is based, or in other words, is at home.  It would be 
the most convenient forum for the individual or for corporate officers, as less 
travel would be typically involved.  It is the forum in which a defendant is most 
likely to be able to find a lawyer without a struggle, either from personal rela-
tionships or from recommendations of friends or colleagues.  It is also the forum 
seeks the transfer). 
308. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317–18 (1945) (discussing two types of 
specific jurisdiction cases and two types of general jurisdiction cases).
309. See Wendy Collins Perdue, Personal Jurisdiction and the Beetle in the Box, 32 B.C. L. REV.
529, 561 (1991) (“[Litigants] care [about personal jurisdiction] not because of abstract philosophical 
reasons, but because the place where the litigation is conducted has a number of practical conse-
quences: choice of law; convenience or inconvenience for one party; and local bias or perception that 
judges or juries in particular locales are more or less generous.”). 
310. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
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with which the defendant is most familiar; even if the defendant has never been 
to court before, he at least probably knows where the courthouse is.  And it is 
the forum in which the defendant feels the least likely to be hurt by local prej-
udice.  Thus, the “at home” test comports with where a potential defendant 
would consent to general jurisdiction. 
Fourth, and turning to the secondary justifications from Supreme Court de-
cisions, the “at home” rule guarantees that the results of general jurisdiction 
analysis are foreseeable.  This justification is premised on limiting personal ju-
risdiction to states in which a defendant could reasonably anticipate being 
sued.311  One potential drawback of this theory is its lack of predictability.312
For instance, Justice Brennan thought personal jurisdiction anywhere a corpo-
ration sent its products was foreseeable.313  But Justice Kennedy clearly thought 
this view of personal jurisdiction swept too broadly.314
The “at home” rule provides much greater clarity to foreseeability: a de-
fendant is subject to general jurisdiction in one (or perhaps two) easily identifi-
able forums.  Additionally, this clarity should limit plaintiffs from using an am-
biguous standard about substantial contacts to shop for the most favorable 
forum.315  Ultimately, the “at home” rule is internally consistent under the fore-
seeability justification because it yields the very result the justification seeks to 
create—a readily identifiable forum in which a defendant may anticipate being 
sued.
Fifth, the convenience of the defendant also fits nicely with the “at home” 
test.  Although litigation may never be easy, litigating in one’s home forum is 
as easy as it could be, for the same reasons that a defendant’s home forum is 
the place where he would logically consent to general jurisdiction.  It requires 
less travel, is more familiar, often has evidence nearby, and allows for easier 
311. See Twitchell, supra note 22, at 631–32. 
312. Cf. id. at 674 (“As with every jurisdiction question, the more ad hoc it becomes, the more 
costly and less predictable it is.”).
313. See Cox, supra note 34, at 194 (“Justice Brennan’s version of equating choice-of-law and 
personal jurisdiction meant that he never saw a case where he did not want to assert personal jurisdic-
tion and seldom found unconstitutional any application of forum law.” (internal footnote omitted)). 
314. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 886–87 (2011) (holding that personal 
jurisdiction did not exist).One could almost apply Justice Stewart’s classic definition of pornography 
to foreseeability without the limitation of the “at home” rule: “I know it when I see it.”  Jacobellis v. 
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
315. See Pielemeier, supra note 60, at 991 (“Permitting numerous jurisdictions to assert general 
jurisdiction over defendants only exacerbates the ability to forum shop, raising choice of law issues, 
which can be expensive to litigate and difficult to resolve.”); cf. Genetin, supra note 7, at 108 (“Broadly 
permitting general jurisdiction when a defendant has continuous and systematic forum contacts multi-
plies the forums in which a defendant may be sued on claims unrelated to its in-state activity, may 
permit a plaintiff unwarranted forum choice, and has impeded U.S. entry into international treaties.”).
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access to a lawyer.316  In addition to making the litigation logistically easier, 
these factors should also drive down the cost of litigation.317
The “at home” test guarantees that general jurisdiction is exercised only in 
this convenient forum.  With specific jurisdiction, there is a connection between 
the forum and the litigation, so even if that forum is not as convenient as the 
defendant’s home forum, it is not necessarily inconvenient because some wit-
nesses or evidence must be in the forum where the lawsuit was filed. 
But an expansive view of general jurisdiction could result in very incon-
venient forums.  Consider the example of the McDonald’s customer who spilt 
hot coffee on himself in Vermont yet sues in Iowa.  In that case, the employees 
and other customers who witnessed the accident and any physical evidence318
would be in Vermont, but these people and the evidence would have to travel 
more than 1,000 miles for trial in Iowa.319  The “at home” rule ensures that this 
cannot happen and that the forum for general jurisdiction is convenient. 
Sixth, a forum’s interest in exercising general jurisdiction is strong only 
when the forum has a special relationship with a defendant.320  Issuing a binding 
judgment against a defendant is a significant power.  And issuing a binding 
judgment against a defendant on a dispute unrelated to the forum is an even 
greater power.321  To be able to exercise this power, a forum ought to have a 
316. See Twitchell, supra note 22, at 667 (“One of the risks associated with broader general 
jurisdiction is the risk of an inconvenient forum.  If the defendant is forced to defend a claim that is 
not related to its forum activities in a forum other than its home base, the lack of litigational support 
and the difficulty in procuring witnesses and proof may make it much harder to defend the claim.”). 
317. Keeping costs down is becoming an increasingly important consideration, and it is at the 
core of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (stating that the Rules should be 
interpreted to “secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding” 
(emphasis added)). 
318. Admittedly, technology makes transporting evidence less difficult, particularly with docu-
ments. But for some physical evidence, transportation will always be necessary. 
319. Professor Stravitz offers an even more extreme example of this situtation. See Stravitz, su-
pra note 250, at 759 (“Hypothetically, if a South Carolinian is injured by the negligence of an Exxon-
Mobil employee in Alaska, a suit may be brought on this claim in a South Carolina court because 
Exxon-Mobil engages in substantially systematic and continuous business activity in South Carolina.  
This theoretical assertion of general jurisdiction may be fundamentally unfair.  Witnesses, if any, pub-
lic safety (police and fire department) official reports, if any, records of initial medical treatment by 
doctors and hospitals, if any, all are located in Alaska.”).Of course, in this example, witnesses and 
evidence would also have to travel to Illinois, if this lawsuit were filed in the state of McDonald’s 
headquarters.  That would still create inconvenience, but the defendant would still enjoy the benefits 
of litigating in its home forum. 
320. Cf. Brilmayer, Haverkamp, & Logan, supra note 19, at 728–29 (“A state has a special rela-
tionship with its domiciliaries that justifies the state’s exercise of judicial and regulatory authority over 
these residents.” (internal footnote omitted)). 
321. See id. at 771 (“By hypothesis, general jurisdiction involves the adjudication of a contro-
versy that is centered outside the forum.  For such controversies, only a direct relationship between the 
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clear reason that it can do so.  The fact that a defendant resides in the forum is 
a clear reason, and one that is much stronger than the fact that a defendant 
simply does a lot of business in the state.322  The difference in being at home 
and merely doing business is not one of degree, but rather, one of kind: a de-
fendant can only be at home in one state (or for a corporation, maybe two 
states), whereas a defendant can do significant amounts of business in all fifty 
states.323
This type of special relationship can be analogized to the parent-child rela-
tionship.324  A parent may discipline a child in any context, even when the par-
ent did not witness the child’s actions.  Similarly, a home forum may enter a 
judgment against a resident defendant for any conduct.  But another adult is like 
a foreign jurisdiction: that adult may often act to help or rebuke a child if that 
adult sees the child’s actions, but that adult generally does not discipline the 
child for unobserved conduct.  The foreign jurisdiction likewise has authority 
only over a defendant’s actions that impacted that forum, or to complete the 
analogy, that the foreign forum “witnessed.” 
Seventh, a defendant’s liberty interest is based on the idea that a defendant 
has a right not to be bound by the judgments of courts of certain states in par-
ticular cases.  This is basically the other side of the coin that is the forum’s 
interest.  Just as a forum state needs a special relationship with a defendant to 
issue a judgment in any case, a defendant needs a special relationship with a 
forum to be bound by a judgment in any case. 
The parent-child analogy again applies here.  Every child has been disci-
plined by a parent for something that the parent learns about only after the fact, 
such as misbehavior at school or at the park.  That punishment is reasonable 
because the parent has ultimate oversight over the child. And so a defendant 
should expect his home forum to do the same thing, as the state that has a unique 
relationship with him. 
forum and the defendant justifies the imposition of the state’s coercive power.  That relationship does 
not rest upon the state’s right to regulate the outside activities, but on its power over the individual 
directly.”).
322. Cf. Stein, supra note 5, at 527 (“Dorothy had it mostly right: There are few places like 
home.”).
323. This justification and the relationship between a state and a defendant underlie Professor 
Cox’s theory of general jurisdiction, which connects a state’s regulatory and adjudicatory authority 
over a defendant. See generally Cox, supra note 34, at 195. 
324. Courts have recognized in a variety of contexts the special relationship between parents and 
children. See, e.g., Doering ex rel. Barrett v. Copper Mountain, Inc., 259 F.3d 1202, 1216 (10th Cir. 
2001) (discussing the parental-immunity doctrine); In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Illinois, on 
May 15, 1979, 771 F.2d 338, 339 (7th Cir. 1985) (discussing who may collect damages in a wrongful-
death suit); Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 850 (W.D. Tex. 2007) (recognizing a parent’s 
duty to a control a child’s conduct). 
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Every child has also been scolded by a friend’s parent or some other adult, 
typically being told to stop some behavior going on at that moment.  But no 
child should expect that other adult to be the one to punish him for the behavior 
at the park or at school that the adult did not see.  The child expects to be free 
from that exercise of authority, just as a defendant who does not live in a par-
ticular forum does not expect that forum to enter judgment against him in a case 
unrelated to that jurisdiction. 
***
Ultimately, regardless of which justification is used for personal jurisdic-
tion, the “at home” test is a positive jurisdictional development.  It is simple 
and easy to apply.  And it fits logically into the framework of each justification 
far better than the older rule of substantial continuous and systematic contacts. 
B. Criticisms of Goodyear and Daimler AG Do Not Make Narrowing 
Unnecessary 
As can be expected with any major Supreme Court decision, Goodyear and 
Daimler provoked much criticism.325  This criticism found a variety of voices 
and bases, but upon closer inspection, none of this criticism provides any basis 
to reject the narrowing of general jurisdiction in Goodyear and Daimler AG.
Rather than canvassing all of the attacks on the “at home” rule, this Article 
focuses only on five of the most prominent critiques, drawn from both Justice 
Sotomayor’s objections in Daimler AG and from scholars, starting with the 
more common critiques. 
A first line of attack on the “at home” rule is that it favors large corporate 
defendants over individual defendants.326  This criticism argues that it is wrong 
to subject a defendant who does some business in a state to general jurisdiction 
there while not to subject major corporation that does more business (in abso-
lute terms) but is not based in the state to general jurisdiction there.327
This criticism, however, ignores that this larger defendant is subject to gen-
eral jurisdiction somewhere else.  It treats general jurisdiction as simply a more 
powerful version of specific jurisdiction. Indeed, the fact that a small defendant 
325. Although decisions on subjects like personal jurisdiction may excite the litigants them-
selves, a few lawyers, and some academics, these decisions admittedly do not attract the same level of 
attention as cases like Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). See, e.g., Andrew Hamm, After-
noon round-up: Today’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, SCOTUSblog (June 26, 2015, 4:30 
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/06/afternoon-round-up-todays-decision-in-obergefell-v-
hodges/ [https://perma.cc/25JJ-S552] (collecting approximately three dozen media stories about Ober-
gefell published within hours of the Court’s release of the decision). 




qt_100-2 Sheet No. 69 Side B      02/22/2017   09:25:38
38800-mqt_100-2 Sheet No. 69 Side B      02/22/2017   09:25:38
C M
Y K
LAMBERT-P.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/17 11:37 AM
424 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [100:375
may be subject to general jurisdiction in one state (from which its business is 
run) while a larger defendant is not subject to general jurisdiction there (and 
from which its business is not run) is not inherently unfair, if general and spe-
cific jurisdiction are different in kind.  The large defendant may still be subject 
to specific jurisdiction, and if that large defendant is not subject to specific ju-
risdiction in a particular case, then the lack of a connection between the litiga-
tion and the forum strongly suggests that a particular lawsuit more logically 
belongs in a different forum. 
A second complaint is that the “at home” rule shifts the burden of litigating 
to plaintiffs.328  This attack fears that plaintiffs, many of whom lack the re-
sources of larger defendants, will face costs that discourage them from bringing 
cases.329
This fear, however, provides no basis to reject the “at home” rule.  First, 
costs and burdens to plaintiffs should not drive any constitutional analysis for 
personal jurisdiction.  That doctrine, after all, is about protecting defendants.
Relative burden is more appropriately considered through the statutory frame-
work of venue, if there are multiple forums in which a defendant could be 
sued.330  Second, even if costs and burdens to plaintiffs are a legitimate concern, 
these can be accounted for by awarding costs to a successful plaintiff.  Although 
the American rule requires litigants to pay their own legal fees unless a statute 
or contract provides otherwise,331 prevailing litigants can be awarded their 
costs.332  Thus, any extra costs from litigating in a less convenient forum may 
be recovered.  Perhaps some plaintiffs might balk at the risk of not having those 
costs covered if their claims did not prevail, but a plaintiff who is confident in 
his claim (or that a defendant would settle the case before trial) is still likely to 
bring a claim. 
A third criticism is that protecting the due process rights of defendants un-
dermines other constitutional rights of plaintiffs.333  This criticism attacks 
328. See id. at 773. 
329. Id.
330. See, e.g., Irwin v. Zila, Inc., 168 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1298 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (considering the 
relative burden on parties when deciding whether to grant a motion to transfer venue). 
331. See, e.g., Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 252–53 (2010) (“Our basic 
point of reference when considering the award of attorney’s fees is the bedrock principle known as the 
‘American Rule’: Each litigant pays his own attorney’s fees, win or lose, unless a statute or contract 
provides otherwise.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
332. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1) (“Unless a federal statute, these rules, or a court order provides 
otherwise, costs—other than attorney’s fees—should be allowed to the prevailing party.”). 
333. See Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 7, at 164 (“[T]he Court’s exclusive concern with due 
process protections for defendants continues a troubling pattern of neglecting or undervaluing other 
constitutional rights and interests.  The focus on due process has prevented consideration of rights 
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Goodyear and Daimler AG for protecting defendants’ right not to litigate in a 
distant forum at the expense of plaintiffs’ rights under other constitutional pro-
visions like the First Amendment or Commerce Clause.334
Ensuring that jurisdictional rules carefully balance constitutional rights is 
important.335  But this criticism of the “at home” rule does what it accuses 
Goodyear and Daimler AG of doing: focusing on some constitutional rights at 
the expense of others.  A plaintiff can bring a claim based on any constitutional, 
statutory, or common-law right against a defendant anywhere a defendant is 
subject to personal jurisdiction.  Thus, that right can be vindicated.  But a plain-
tiff’s ability to vindicate this right does not mean that the plaintiff can vindicate 
it in any forum he chooses, or even that a plaintiff is entitled to an array of 
forums from which he may choose.  A defendant has a right to be bound by a 
judgment only in a court that has personal jurisdiction over the defendant.  Spe-
cific jurisdiction provides a plaintiff some flexibility in where a suit is filed and 
may permit suit in a distant forum.  General jurisdiction, meanwhile, provides 
a location where the plaintiff knows a suit can be filed, even if the plaintiff may 
have to travel.  In either case, the plaintiff has a place to vindicate his rights. 
Limiting general jurisdiction, therefore, does not undermine other constitu-
tional rights.  It simply protects a defendant’s right not to be bound by judg-
ments from the courts of certain states in certain cases.336
Another criticism of Goodyear and Daimler AG is that the “at home” rule 
fails to provide sufficient guidance for general jurisdiction.  These critiques ob-
ject to the use of a new metaphor337 and express the frustration with the fact that 
the decisions leave open questions.338
“At home” may in fact be new terminology, but it is not a problem.  For 
protected by and powers regulated under the Commerce Clause and the First Amendment.  It also 
neglects residual rights including meaningful access to courts implied by a Constitution establishing 
justice and expressly protected by due process.” (internal footnotes omitted)). 
334. Id. at 164–65.
335. Cf. Wm. Grayson Lambert, Toward A Better Understanding of Ripeness and Free Speech 
Claims, 65 S.C. L. REV. 411, 447–52 (2013) (arguing that First Amendment claims do not merit a 
special ripeness test because other constitutional rights are equally important). 
336. Granted, in some rare cases, a defendant may not be subject to personal jurisdiction in the 
United States. See, e.g., J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 887 (2011).  But this is a 
truly exceptional case. And a plaintiff could (albeit with more trouble) still sue in a foreign country. 
337. See Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 7, at 161 (“The new rules are also bad theory to the 
extent they substitute new metaphors (‘at home’) for old terminology (‘substantial contacts’), old ter-
minology that was itself an attempt to avoid unhelpful metaphors (‘presence’).”). 
338. See id. at 149 (noting the open questions that remain regarding general jurisdiction). 
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one, most of the Court’s confusing metaphors have appeared in specific juris-
dictions cases.339  Additionally, it is not simply another way of saying “pres-
ence” or “sufficient contacts.”  Rather, it is a new concept that focuses on 
whether a defendant is (to use another neologism) “based in” the forum.  Under 
the “at home” analysis, a defendant is subject to general jurisdiction in only one 
forum (or maybe two), requiring a holistic view of general jurisdiction across 
all forums that brings simplicity and clarity.340  By contrast, the old rule asked, 
for each jurisdiction, whether a defendant had substantial contacts to warrant 
the exercise of general jurisdiction, requiring a court to decide “yes” or “no” 
for each jurisdiction individually.341  That analysis is less predictable because 
the “yes” or “no” analysis for each jurisdiction is independent of the analysis 
for every other jurisdiction.  Thus, the new terminology should lead to far less 
confusion than the old metaphors. 
As for the second part of this critique, the “at home” rule offers as much of 
an answer to general jurisdiction as these decisions can reasonably be expected 
to provide early in the life of this rule.  First, Daimler AG made clear that the 
“at home” rule should resolve the overwhelming majority of cases because only 
“exceptional” cases could result in general jurisdiction when the defendant was 
sued somewhere other than the defendant’s domicile, place of incorporation, or 
principal place of business.342  Any litigation over whether a defendant is “at 
home” in another state will therefore be uncommon.343  Second, and more fun-
damentally, virtually every judicial decision requires further refinement down 
the road.344  At this stage, the “at home” rule provides clear guidance, unlike 
339.  See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 109 (1987) (using the lan-
guage of “purposeful availment”); McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) (using the 
language of “substantial connection”). 
340. Cf. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 762 n.20 (2014) (“General jurisdiction instead 
calls for an appraisal of a corporation’s activities in their entirety, nationwide and worldwide.  A cor-
poration that operates in many places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of them.”). 
341. Hoffheimer, supra note 5, at 595.
342. Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 761 n.19. 
343. See supra Part IV.A.1 (discussing the clarity of the “at home” rule). 
344. This is more common with high-profile social issues, such as abortion, compare Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164, 166 (1973) (holding that a state ban on abortions was unconstitutional), with
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 168 (2007) (holding that a federal partial-birth abortion ban was 
constitutional), but still present with questions involving less attention from the public at large, such 
as procedural rules, compare Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957) (holding that a complaint 
was sufficient “unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of 
his claim which would entitle him to relief”), with Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (holding 
that a complaint must have “facial plausibility” to survive a motion to dismiss).  In some instances, 
future litigation attacks a previous holding directly, while in others, future litigation seeks only refine-
ment of the earlier holding.  Whatever the scope of the relief sought, what is evident is that jurispru-
dence is always evolving. 
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the older rule of substantial continuous and systematic contacts345 or less bright-
line alternatives, like the one pushed by the plaintiffs in Goodyear.346
A fifth and final (for purposes of this Article) criticism is that the “at home” 
rule is too antiquated for a global economy.347  The rule is only antiquated, 
however, if one ignores the “special relationship” that a state has with the indi-
viduals and businesses based there.348  A global economy may lead to defend-
ants being subject to specific personal jurisdiction in an array of states in which 
they could not have conceived of being sued a century ago.  But as for binding 
a defendant—whether to pay money or to take or refrain from taking certain 
actions—in any case whatsoever, the fact that the defendant does business 
around the country (or even around the world) does not mean that any of those 
places where the defendant does business ought to have the power to so broadly 
control the defendant.  Indeed, that special power should be narrow in scope 
and belong only to the state where the defendant is at home. 
VI. CONCLUSION
When that bus tire blew on a French road, little could anyone have predicted 
that a case filed in North Carolina state court would be the genesis in a revolu-
tion of general jurisdiction.  But often significant legal changes—particularly 
procedural or jurisdictional ones—come without the litigants intending to bring 
about such changes.  In Goodyear and then in Daimler AG, the Supreme Court 
narrowed the scope of the general jurisdiction, requiring a defendant to be “at 
home” for a court to exercise general jurisdiction over that defendant. 
This narrowing of general jurisdiction has been maligned by many scholars.  
These attacks, however, miss their mark.  Goodyear’s “at home” test is a wel-
come change to personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. It is a clear and an inter-
nally consistent rule that makes the doctrine more coherent with the justifica-
tions for personal jurisdiction—whichever justification one chooses. 
345. See Stravitz, supra note 250, at 759 (noting that “the ‘essentially at home’ standard may 
serve as a limiting factor on the ambiguous substantially systematic and continuous standard”). 
346. The plaintiffs there did not necessarily advocate a break with the standard adopted in Per-
kins, but they certainly pushed a broad version of it regarding jurisdiction over related corporations.  
See Brief of Respondents at 44–50, Goodyear Luxembourg Tires, SA v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011) 
(No. 10-76).
347. See Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 771; see also Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 7, at 133 
(discussing Justice Sotomayor’s opinion). 
348. Brilmayer, Haverkamp, & Logan, supra note 19, at 726. 
